The Organizational Sustainability of Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations in South Korea:

A Preliminary Study of Autonomy, Public Perception, and Advocacy

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Abstract

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Abstract: This thesis investigates Korean environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) operating in the non-Western setting of the Republic of South Korea by presenting a literature review of the history of Korean NGOs and the environmental movement in Korea, and analyzing data gathered while conducting interviews at a selection of Korean ENGOs. Using the Family Health International (FHI) 360 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI), this study advances the field of research on the Korean civil society sector by offering insights into how Korean ENGOs have adapted to changes and sustained themselves as organizations. It examines Korean ENGOs' autonomy from the Korean government, the impact of government funding on ENGOs advocacy, and ENGOs' concern about how they are perceived by other sectors in Korea. The findings reveal three hypotheses for further research on the ENGO sector in Korea and other parts of the world.

Key Words: South Korea, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), organizational sustainability, environmental movement, autonomy, advocacy, public image

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Abbreviations:

CNP	Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project
CSOSI	Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index
ENGO	Environmental Nongovernmental Organization
FHI	Family Health International
MOE	Ministry of Environment
MOF	Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries
MOIS	Ministry of Interior and Safety
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

I. Introduction and Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) Sector: Historical Review

This thesis investigates environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) operating in the non-Western setting of the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) by presenting a literature review of the history of Korean NGOs and the environmental movement in Korea, and analyzing data gathered while conducting interviews at a selection of Korean ENGOs. It aims to advance the study of the Korean civil society sector by offering insights into how Korean ENGOs have adapted to changes and sustained themselves as organizations. It attempts to examine ENGOs' autonomy from the Korean government, the impact of government funding on ENGOs advocacy, and ENGOs' concern about how they are perceived by other sectors in Korea. It is only by giving weight to, and with full awareness of these themes that an understanding of the Korean civil society sector may evolve, that suggestions for future studies in this emergent field be made, and that clearer answers to the following questions may emerge:

1. What factors impact the autonomy of Korean ENGOs from the Korean government?
2. Do Korea ENGOs adjust their advocacy strategies to avail themselves of government funding? If so, how?
3. Are Korean ENGOs concerned about how they are perceived by the public, business, and government sectors?

Civil Society, Democratization, and Politicization

A Western world-view recognizes three societal sectors, which are composed of, in their typically listed order, governmental organizations, business (for-profit) organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Conventional Western academia, analyzing NGOs in many parts of the world, suggests NGOs encompass a "civil society sector" (sometimes referred

to as a "third sector") consisting of formal and informal organizations representing a theorized greater "civil society." The supra-sectoral Western concept of a civil society, as it pertains to NGOs, should provide a niche in which NGOs act autonomously from the government and business sectors (Bidet, 2002; Koo, 2002, Kim & Hwang, 2002; Salamon et al., 2004, Howard, 2004). Some researchers, analyzing non-Western democratizing societies that have emerged from collapsed, oppressive regimes, such as the former Soviet Union, (Koo, 2002; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2016) suggest the growth of a country's NGO sector may, in fact, be a measurement of civil society. It is suggested grassroots efforts in these nations can transition into sustainable NGOs capable of providing services and advocating on behalf of the public, and do so in a non-politicized manner independent of state control. (Salamon et al., 2004; Howard, 2004).

This Western interpretation suggesting the link between civil society and democratization results in organizational sustainability of NGOs in non-Western societies has become a topic of recent academic conversation (Salamon et al., 2004; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2016; Ha, miemo, 2019). For example, in Eastern European countries, where there is a growing number of advocacy and service-providing NGOs, and where an NGO's legitimacy requires grassroots-level community and hobby group support, organizational sustainability appears to be achievable only with foreign financial support. (Dolšak, 2016). Korea is another non-Western, newly democratized state that has seen a recent expansion of its NGO sector, yet the extent to which the Western notions "civil society sector" and "civil society" can be credited, or even play a role, remains a question of debate (Kim & Hwang, 20020; Ha, miemo, 2019).

In one camp, some scholars of Korea suggest the expansion of Korean NGOs derive from a vibrant rebirth of a once-dormant civil society (Koo, 2002; Kim & Hwang; Salamon et al., 2004; Park et al., 2004; Joo et al., 2006; Kim, 2009; Oh, 2012). These scholars note the domestic NGO

sector emerged during Korea's Democratization movement of 1987 and began providing services and advocating across an array of issues including education, health, environment, women's rights, social justice, and art and culture (Bidet, 2002; Park et al., Kim, 2009; Oh, 2012). Succeeding decades brought an expansion to Korea's NGO sector, and more than half (an estimated 56%) of Korean NGOs are thought to have been founded following democratization (Kim, 2009, pp. 875). During democratization, and unique to Korea, radical labor activists joined forces with environmental activists in a short-lived partnership. This partnership, along with grassroots efforts and an expansion of public support within Korea, is credited with giving rise to Korea's current environmental movement. The environmental movement experienced rapid growth; an estimated 87% of Korean ENGOs were founded in the 1990s (Kim, 2009, pp. 875). It evolved into a moderate, middle class sector focused on improving welfare (Koo, 2002; Ju & Tang, 2011), and quickly achieved international recognition evidenced by invites for Korean ENGOs to participate in the 1992 United Nations Rio Conference on Environment and Development (Moon, 2004; Ju & Tang, 2011). Civil sector proponents look to well-known Korean ENGOs, such as the Korean Federation of Environmental Movements (KFEM), which by 2000 had anywhere from 50,000 to 70,000 Korean national members, as model examples of how the NGO sector in Korea represents a Korean civil society that gives a voice to those concerned with welfare and environmental issues (Koo, 2002; Bidet, 2002; Ju & Tang, 2011).

While such Korean environmental organizations and the rise of the environmental movement post-democratization appear to fit the Western definition of civil society, care must be taken applying such universalities to the non-Western world, and specifically, to Korea. A measure of the number of ENGOs, or ENGO membership, may not, for example, apply similarly to a Korean society facing, as it does, the path of late industrialized development (Ha, miemo, 2019).

In addition, the definition of civil society implies a sphere that is autonomous from the state. This relationship clearly does not apply to post-democratization Korea where the government heavily intervenes in the national economy (Bidet, 2002), and is, in fact, embedded in ENGOs in ways that are difficult to imagine in a Western setting. If Korean ENGOs could manage to separate themselves from their government, their autonomy would still be jeopardized by their need to maneuver within the fabric created by the characteristic Korean societal ties to family, to workplace, to clan, and to region. Furthermore, studies have shown that while Korean ENGOs may have taken a moderate approach to their advocacy post-democratization, the movement grew out of anti-authoritarian sentiments, and, as a result, is inherently political (Ju & Tang, 2011). In other words, a universalized concept like civil society is difficult to apply to the Korean case because the preconceived notion of civil society emerging from democratization does not explain the Korean case – not when present-day Korean society has developed largely due to state control (Ha, miemo, 2019). Because the Western notion of civil society does not consider unique paths of social development, the debate over the emergence, and even the existence, of a Korean civil society, and, certainly, its effects on organizational sustainability of Korean ENGOs remains open (Kim & Hwang, 2002; Ha, miemo, 2019).

Defining "NGO" in Korean

Historically, the NGO sector in Korea has been difficult to define. The literature published in western academia on Korean NGOs uses a variety of terminology, especially across fields, to address the sector and organizations within it. Literature published in English may generally apply terminology such as the "third sector," "civil society organizations" (CSO), "citizen organizations," and "nonprofit organizations" (NPO) (Joo, 2000; Salamon, 2010). In order to apply the most appropriate terminology for an English-language study of Korean ENGOs, we must first try to

understand the Korean terms to learn where the western academic term "NGO" fits appropriately in the Korean case. To address the discrepancies in the English literature and provide the appropriate context, scholars Inchoon Kim and Changsoo Hwang detail the structure of the nonprofit sector in Korea (**Figure 1**), providing definitions for terminology used in Korean (2002).



Figure 1: Diagram of the levels of the Nonprofit and Nongovernmental Sector in South Korea as defined by Kim and Hwang (2002) and adapted into "Figure 1. Extent of Nonprofit Organizations in Korea" (Seo, 2016, pp. 222). A box is added to establish the scope of this study, which are all organizations that can be defined as NGOs.

In Korea, *biyeongri danche* (비영리단체), or nonprofit organization (NPO), is used as an all-encompassing umbrella term for all non-governmental, non-business organizations operating in Korea. The term *mingan danche* (민간단체), translates literally into "civilian organization," but is also commonly translated as "nongovernmental organization" (NGO) as the Korean term *mingan* (민간) or "civilian" may also evoke the idea of a "civilian sector" (pp. 5). In English-language academia, "NGO" is a term used often and sometimes interchangeably with "NPO," but Korean NGOs, according to Kim and Hwang, do not include schools, universities, or hospitals,

which may be nonprofit organizations. This study will focus on all organizations that are within the scope of NGOs.

Within the broad net of NGOs are two more specific categories of organizations called *sinmin danche* (시민단체), which translates to "citizen organization" (Kim & Hwang, 2002, pp. 6) and *sinmin undong danche* (시민운동단체), or civil movement organizations (CMOs) (Kim & Hwang, 2002, pp. 7). *Simin* (시민) means citizen, but it can also evoke the notion of civility as the Korean phrase for civil society is *simin sahoe* (시민사회). Citizen organizations are therefore also referred to by Kim and Hwang as "civil society organizations" (CSO). Korean CSOs are perceived as public-interest driven NGOs that advocate for moderate issues such as the environment and monitor the government. CMOs are activist organizations working on issues relating to democratization and advocating for justice and quality-of-life improvements. Because CSOs and CMOs are under the NGO umbrella, they are subject to the same registration laws, mentioned later, if they choose to register.

While the four terms defined by Kim and Hwang are often used in academic literature, there are two legally distinct categories of NPOs that have registered under the Non-Profit, Non-Governmental Organizations Act (비영리민간단체지원법) (henceforth referred to as the NGO Support Law): *beobin* (법인) and *biyeongri mingan danche* (비영리민간단체) (Kim & Hwang, 2002, pp. 7-8). The first term, *beobin* translates into "corporation," or an "incorporated associate" (pp. 7). In some cases, "legal person" and "legal entity" may also be used as translations (pp. 8). In order to reduce confusion with business-corporations and individual people, this study will refer to *beobin* organizations as legal entities. Legal entities are NPOs that have registered to the government with an incorporated association status, which may be any "association or foundation

relating to science, religion, charity, art, or social intercourse or otherwise relating to enterprises not engaged for profit or gain may be made a legal person subject to the permission of the relevant ministries" (pp. 8). Legal entity status thus assists organizations that wish to partake in enterprises that are not-for-profit.

NPOs that register legally, but do not opt for legal entity status are legally referred to as *biyeongri mingan danche*, or "nonprofit civil organizations" (Kim & Hwang, 2002, pp. 8). According to the NGO Support Law, this term may also be translated as "nonprofit nongovernmental organizations" (MOIS, Act No.14839, 2017). Organizations that register under the NGO Support Law with or without legal entity status are given several benefits. According to the law, these benefits include administrative assistance and financial support of public-interest business (공익 사업) (Article 5), subsidiaries for public-interest business (Articles 6-9[1]), tax reduction or exemption (Article 10), and subsidized postage (Article 11) (MOIS, Act No.14839, 2017). These benefits are provided to any NGO registered at the city, province, or ministry levels. The NGO Support Law was enacted in 2000, and has since been updated in 2008, 2015, 2016, 2017, and again in 2020. The only benefits that have not been amended since 2000 are Articles 10 and 11 on tax reduction and subsidized postage, respectively (MOIS, Act No. 17374, 2020).

Despite benefits that NGOs receive from registration, it is believed that a majority of NGOs in Korea are not registered (Kim & Hwang, 2002). There is no readily accessible database of all Korean NGOs, registered or not. For the purpose of this study, "ENGO" is limited to the definition of environmental NGOs officially registered as either legal entities or nonprofit civil organizations by the NGO Support Law to the Ministry of Environment and major cities' Departments of Environment. The NGO lists used in this study do not include schools, universities, or hospitals,

[1] It should be noted that the NGO Support Law was updated in June of 2020. Minor amendments have been made to Article 7 and 8 regarding public interest business, which did not apply to ENGOs at the time of this study (2019).

thus *mingan danchae*, or NGO, is the most appropriate level for this study rather than NPO. Furthermore, while most NGOs in this study identify as CSOs following Kim and Hwan's definition, the registration lists may include business and professional associations, social services, foundations, and cultural organizations, thus "NGO" remains the most appropriate term for the scope of this research.

Challenges to the Sustainability of the Korean NGO Sector

By exploring how Korean NGOs align with the western definition of the third sector, scholar Eric Bidet believes that the Korean NGO sector mostly aligns with the western definition of a third sector, with some caveats (Bidet, 2002). The first difference is that Korean NGOs, or nonprofit organizations (NPOs) as he studies them, are fewer in number compared to European NPOs and fewer register with the government than do those in Europe. A second difference is that volunteering is weaker in Korean NGOs than it is for those in Europe (also in Park et al., 2004). The final major difference is that in Korea, NGOs need to apply to receive government approval to register officially, and scrutiny by officials may result in denials.

Following the warning of Bidet, scholar Euiyoung Kim claims that the nature of the Korean NGO sector may already be too political to be operating autonomously from the state (Kim, 2009). Korean NGOs are showing signs that they are becoming "too close for comfort" as these organizations may be operating more as the "fourth arm of government" (pp. 888, 878). This closeness is thought to stem from the government's offering financial assistance to NGOs that carry out advocacy projects aligning with the government's agenda rather than the public's agenda. Kim emphasizes that Korean NGOs that receive such government funding are in danger of co-optation by the government. Kim uses Gallup Korea polls to reveal that NGOs were the most trusted institutions in Korean society in the year 2002, but in 2007, marking a change, institutional

trust in NGOs slid to third place (after the army and TV broadcasting stations). Kim argues that the public's perceived image of NGOs is important as NGOs should be representatives of civil society, but NGOs are acting more like "citizen movements without citizens" because they are politicized or at risk of over-politicization (Kim, 2009; Ha, miemo, 2019). If this is the case, the over-politicization may impede the long-term sustainability of these organizations, as Bidet also argues (Bidet, 2002; Kim, 2009). With a decrease in the public's trust in the Korean NGO sector, NGOs put themselves at risk of losing their public support base and the membership fees they rely on. Receiving government funding is not necessarily a sign on politicization, according to Kim, but it places NGOs at risk for co-optation by the government to implement political favors (Kim, 2009). Without increasing transparency, Kim does not believe that NGOs can be held accountable and thus risk further losing their support from the Korean public.

Korean Environmental NGOs (ENGOs)

Scholars of Korean ENGOs, Chang bum Ju and Shui-Yan Tang, take to examining the political contestation embedded, specifically, in n the history specifically of Korean environmental NGOs (ENGOs) (Ju & Tang, 2011). They find that ENGOs are unique in Korea as they shifted their agendas and public image after democratization. Anti-pollution organizations went from "radical and militant" groups focused on political democratization to professional groups focused on moderate advocacy of environmental issues (pp. 1056). Because they represented a moderate issue within the public sphere and had international support, Korean ENGOs gained the legitimacy to begin working at Blue House, or *Cheongwadae* (청와대)[2], advisors to the first civilian presidents throughout the 1990s. These early ENGOs began to receive grants after working with

[2] The Blue House, located in Seoul, is the official residence of the Korean president, like the White House in the US.

these progressive governments. As the public began associating government funding with perceived political power of ENGOs, and the image of ENGOs began to rate less positive, organizations with large membership chose to reduce their dependency on government financial support, while smaller ENGOs did not.

While receiving government funding does not directly correlate with over-politicization, scholar Jung Wook Seo uncovers that, regarding financial management structures, the more diverse funding sources an NPO has, the more likely it is to advocate for a variety of issues (Seo, 2016). Furthermore, reliance on one source alone can then lead to "isomorphism," or similar formation, between the NGO and that source (pp. 223). While noting financial resources are necessary for Korean NPOs to achieve their advocacy goals, Seo also found that when entering funding competitions either through foundations or the government, the clarity of the organization's mission and goals is "crucial for receiving foundation grants and government grants" (pp. 232). The extent to which the mission and goals might be changed by an ENGO due to competitive pressure is not answered in this study. However, it is important to note that while working with the government and even receiving government funding may not be signs of over-politicization, the alignment of values between the government and an organization might. Scholar Thomas J. Ward examines the political economy of NGOs, including ENGOs and shares that, "NGOs, representing the third sector, constitute the *moral high ground.* They differ from business and politics by their commitment to values." (Ward, 2005, pp. 2) Here, Ward explains that there is a separation from business and politics, but that separation exists at the level of values and morals. Korean ENGOs stem from anti-pollution, anti-authoritarian roots, which may be seen as values that do not align with government-led development. However, after democratization, Korean ENGOs worked closely with progressive governments and received financial support. To

develop a more complete picture, a further investigation into the history of Korean environmentalism and the growth of Korean ENGOs is required.

History of Environmentalism and ENGOs in Korea

Emergence of the Korean Environmental Movement

According to Kim and Hwang, pre-1945 or during Japanese occupation, semblances of organized volunteer groups, some based on kinship and some based on village ties, emerge as largely "agrarian social systems" were socially separated from other factions of society (pp. 2). Throughout the period after Japanese colonization, the Korean War, and the 1960s, Koreans formed political and social organizations that provided welfare services in agrarian areas with the support of foreign aid. President Park Chung Hee's government (1963-1979) sought to halt any organizations that showed the slightest signs of communism (Cumings, 2002), and Park's anticommunist agenda became more and more strict through his years in office. He declared martial law in 1972, using this time to restructure the bureaucracy and tighten laws on organizing (Kim H.A., 2004; Liu, 2015). Opposition to Park grew, and the Minjung movement, or the People's movement, formed as laborers and the "working masses" organized alongside Protestant and Catholic leaders (Kim, 2004, pp. 6, 159). Unknown to many Koreans, the environmental movement emerged around the same time with a rise in unwelcomed toxic waste that rural residents were exposed to by the nearby factories built by President Park Chung Hee in the 1960s (Moon, 2004; Ju & Tang, 2011; Liu, 2015). Factory pollution caused Onsan Illness, polluted waterways, resulted in crop failures, and these scenarios sprouted up repeatedly in rural, industrializing areas such as Onsan, Busan, and Ulsan (Ku, 2011; Liu, 2015). Residents protested the factories and the government, but the only mitigation efforts secured were offers to provide residents with meager compensation by the government or the polluting factories and to relocate

those impacted to the cities (Liu, 2015). Park's administration enacted the Pollution Prevention Law in 1963, but no governing body enforced the law (Moon, 2004). In the 1960s, pollution was not a nationally recognized issue, and the Park administration's prioritization of industrialization placed emphasis on keeping factories open and outputs high, and all "environmental policy in Korea was negligible before 1980" (pp. 224).

Formation of Anti-Authoritarian Environmental Organizations

In order to quell the growing environmental consciousness of the public, Park's administration enacted a replacement anti-pollution law, the Environmental Preservation Law, in 1977 and established the Bureau of Environment to enforce it (Moon, 2004). While there was an enforcement mechanism to this law, pollution did not stop; factory output requiring heavy use of chemicals and industrialization remained key to Park's economic plans after 1973 (Kim H.A., 2004). It was not until the following decade that pollution-related environmental issues rose to the national conscious. In 1980, after Park's 1979 assassination, the Korean government struggled to reorganize its ranks while anti-authoritarian, anti-military regime sentiments grew among the Korean public. These sentiments escalated when then Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Chun Doo Hwan, executed a coup and ordered nation-wide martial law on May 17, 1980 (Kim H.A., 2004). Later that year, Chun Doo Hwan was sworn in as president of Korea. These are the events that started the new decade – one leading to democratization. It is important to note the Korean public's growing anti-authoritarianism and activism was already present at this time. As president, Chun proclaimed that he would work on improving the welfare of the Korean people, and his administration amended the Environmental Preservation Law several times throughout his regime (Moon, 2004). Amendments included taxes on polluting companies and stricter measures, such as, environmental impact assessments, however, these measures were not

well enforced. After the Onsan Incident of 1985, the first environmental organization, the Korean Pollution Research Institute (KPRI), spread the story across Korea (Liu, 2015). The KPRI was established in 1982 and advocated for improved quality of water for human health via government intervention, rather than settlements and relocation. Not long after KPRI formed, two other environmental groups emerged[3]. The organizations that formed in the 1980s largely framed their missions as "anti-pollution" rather than pro-environmental, which framed their advocacy to establish a "a clear line between the polluters and the victims and considered the capitalist system as the primary cause of pollution" (Lee & So, 1999, pp. 96). Amidst a decade of instability fueled by anti-authoritarianism and student protests, the rising anti-pollution movement followed suit, inserting itself into the "anti-government, leftist ideology" (Liu, 2015, pp. 123). As anti-pollution became pro-democracy, the Korean environmental movement in the 1980s became political in nature (Ju & Tang, 2011). Thus, the anti-pollution activists and organizations seamlessly integrated themselves into the Democratization Movement of 1987 (Kim & Hwang, 2002; Kim, 2009; Ju & Tang, 2011; Ju, 2011, Seo, 2016). Because the environmental movement, while anti-authoritarian, was harder for the government to suppress, it became a "significant force for democratization" in Korea (Rootes, 2004, pp. 631).

Post-Democratization Environmentalism (1987 onwards)

The supporting role environmental organizations played during the democratization movement provided them with the legitimacy required to grow within the civic sector (Korten, 1987). The Korean middle class was largely supportive of the environmental movement, and after democratization, the movement divided from the radical Minjung movement, transforming into a

[3] The Pollution Opposition Citizen Movement Council (POCMC) and the Pollution Eradication Movement Youth Council (PEMYC) organized in 1983 also with the goal of exposing pollution resulting from unregulated development (Ju & Tang, 2011)

more moderate environmental movement. The moderate "quality-of-life" concerns such as anti-pollution and anti-nuclear allowed for these ENGOs to emerge as a strong proponent of reform after democratization (Kim, 2009, pp. 879). After solidification of democratization, the shift in political structure allowed for open public discussion of environmental issues and possible reform. Korean ENGOs formed at a rapid pace. The Korean Anti-Pollution Movement Association (KAPMA) organized in 1988, and later merged with eight other environmental movements to form the largest Korean ENGO, the Korean Federation for Environmental Movements (KFEM), or *Hwangyeong Undong Yeonghap* (환경운동연합) in 1993. To Koo, the rising number of NGOs founded, and their support exhibits a Korean middle class finding their voice. This voice, which was to be represented by NGOs such as KFEM, would then protect the civilian sector against anything reminiscent of authoritarian government intervention, including subjection to pollution from factories. Korean ENGOs therefore became the voice of the middle class on environmental issues that both concerned them and were inherently political; the pre-democratization issue of pollution and the post-democratization anti-nuclear movement (Lee & So, 1999; Liu, 2015). The environmental movement in post-democratization Korea thus remained political, yet moderate compared to the labor movement.

International Legitimacy of Korean ENGOs

During President Roh Tae Woo's administration (1988-1993), Korean ENGOs were presented an opportunity to represent the Korean environmental agenda on the international stage. In 1992, the United Nations (UN) hosted the first Rio Conference on Environment and Development, to which members of KAPMA were selected to attend. Scholars of Korean ENGOs acknowledge that the Rio Conference gave these activists recognition at the international level, which in Korea, translated into domestic legitimacy of ENGOs as the Korean government began

to feel the pressure of globalism and the international environmental movement (Moon, 2004; Ju & Tang, 2011).

NGO Relationships with the State (1993-2008)

In the following year (1993) the progressive opposition leader of the Democratization movement, Kim Young Sam (1993 -1998) was elected as the first civilian (non-military) president. Following Kim, two other progressive opposition leaders were elected to serve as president, Presidents Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2008). President Kim Young Sam's relationship with NGOs is described as "cooperative" (Kim, 2009). He began funding NGOs that assisted his administration, and because of this financial assistance, new NGOs were founded in unprecedented numbers. The promise of funding alone and its endorsement by the National Assembly by 1998, was a driving factor in the increase of newly formed ENGOs as the numbers doubled between 1997 and 1998 from 23 to 41 (Ju & Tang, 2011, pp. 1059). During the IMF Financial Crisis of 1997, the NGO sector, including ENGOs, solidified its role as public service providers by stepping in to fill gaps left by the financially failed state that was unable to provide services for the unemployed and low-income. In return, NGOs gained legitimacy by working with the government to provide services to the public and gained visibility in the public (Ju & Tang, 2011). The combination of international recognition, legitimacy from the government, increased visibility in the public, and the financial assistance from the government worked together to allow ENGOs to expand and work even more closely with Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun throughout the 1990s into the new millennium.

In January 2000, President Kim Dae Jung's administration officially enacted the NGO Support Law providing NGOs with institutional legitimacy through registration and access to financial support through annual public-interest business project competitions. Registration had to

be approved or denied by the government, and only registered NGOs were eligible to receive government funds from any public-interest project competitions. In the year 2000, the total funding available for public-interest projects equated to USD $15 million (not adjusted for inflation).). At the end of the 20th century, and for the first time in Korea, the NGO sector was formalized through policy and recognized as a partner in governance.

Under progressive President Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2008), the government acted with NGOs under the slogan "participatory government" (Kim, 2009). President Roh increased collaboration with NGOs by directly appointing NGO presidents and senior activists to serve as presidential advisors in the Blue House. While President Roh's administration continued to support NGOs, the organizations that participated in the 2000 election anti-corruption campaign, which targeted corrupt politicians across all political parties, were perceived as less moral in the eyes of the public for having violated Korea's strict election laws (Kim, 2009; Ju & Tang, 2011). The public backlash led to the National Assembly members lowering the amount in the funding pool for public-interest projects from USD $15 million to USD $10 million (Ju & Tang, 2011). Another hit to the NGO sector occurred when both ruling (progressive) and opposition (conservative) party members in the National Assembly decided to halt the subsidization of NGOs that opposed state policies. This decision was based on the disruptive NGO protests of the free trade agreement with the United States in 2006. Also during Roh's administration, progressive lawmakers attempted to halt the funding of pseudo-civil organizations, or *kwanbyeon danche* (관변단체), but the funding continued as some pseudo-civil organizations had successfully registered as NGOs. The growing difficulties in differentiating NGOs and pseudo-civil organizations led lawmakers to question the legitimacy of NGOs. Despite these obstacles in funding, Ju and Tang estimate that ENGOs received 31% of their funding from the government in 2006, with 93% of NGOs based in Seoul

receiving government funding with a median of USD $67,000 and average of USD $251,204 (pp. 1060). According to a comparison of other industrialized nations, Ju and Tang claim that 31% fits in behind Australia (38%) and France (32%) and before Japan (27%) (pp. 1060). While these numbers match those other nations that are relatively comparable to South Korea, there became a growing issue of financial dependence of ENGOs on the government. Interviews of ENGOs conducted in 2007 by Ju and Tang show that certain ENGOs continued to protest government development projects despite receiving funding while others rewrote their mission statements to be more appealing to the government agencies to which they applied for grants. Environmental NGO protests of government projects and policies continued despite received funding. This funding did decrease in amount, but ENGOs that protested the Roh administration continued to receive disbursements, and none seem to have had funding revoked.

NGO Relationships with the State (2008-onwards)

In 2008 political power shifted towards the conservative opposition as a powerful, rising, rightwing political movement successfully elected President Lee Myung Bak (2008-2013) to office. To many, Lee's election signaled a shift backwards towards the pre-democratization, state-society relations and the suppression of civil society (Oh, 2012). President Lee's conservative base was skeptical about the legitimacy of NGOs, especially ENGOs such as KFEM. President Lee's administration and conservative lawmakers ordered investigations of NGOs for improper use of government grant money (Ju & Tang, 2011). In further opposition to the NGOs sector, Lee's administration decreased the available funding again, from $10 million USD down to USD $5 million USD (pp. 1061). Prominant NGOs that were suspected of misuse of funds and/or involvement in the 2008 beef import protests and those that protested government policies, were blocked from receiving any government funding through public-interest project competitions.

Despite the top-down opposition, during Lee's presidency, there was an increase in registration of NGOs to the Ministry of Environment (**Figure 2**). This may have been in opposition to Lee's policy on beef import as well as his mega development projects such as the Four Major Rivers Project. Despite the increase in registration and growing opposition of NGOs to Lee's administration, Lee eventually ordered the closing of channels of communication that were once open between NGOs and the government. To Lee's supporters, this signified a cut off of political influence of NGOs. While Korean NGOs lost direct access to the Blue House, it is possible that they explored other channels of political participation, such as working with ministries or National Assembly members. As English-language literature does not elaborate on the venue seeking of Korean NGOs, further study is necessary to fill in these gaps.



Figure 2: *Number of ENGOs registered to the Ministry of Environment during each presidency.*

In 2013, President Park Geun Hye (daughter of former president Park Chun Hee) was elected as the second conservative leader after Lee Myung Bak. Her administration (dates) continued to implement large-scale environmental projects such as the Seoraksan cable car installation. There is no English-language published literature examining Park's relationship with

ENGOs, making it challenging to assess relationships between ENGOs and her administration. That said, it is evident that there was a decrease in ENGO registration to the Ministry of Environment (MOE) (Figure 2). This may indicate either less ENGOs chose to go through the registration process or less ENGOs were approved for registration with the MOE. Through a special election following Park Geun Hye's impeachment in March of 2017, Koreans elected the current progressive president, Moon Jae In, to office. As with the Park administration, no English-language research is available on the relationship between the Moon administration and ENGOs. Further investigation is required to make an assessment.

Organizational Sustainability of ENGOs

Are Korean ENGOs at risk of losing their autonomy? Are ENGOs changing their agendas to algin with the government in order to receive increasingly competitive funding? How does their public perception change and impact their work? These research questions all lead to one greater question: H*ow do Korean ENGOs sustain themselves?* This question is challenging to answer, but a qualitative index of "organizational sustainability" may be used to begin to determine the sustainability of Korean ENGOs through examining how the three themes of this study (autonomy, agenda alignment, and public perception) apply to the indicators withing the index.

The organizational sustainability of an NGO is its ability to play its role as the voice of a nation's civil society and maintain this role over time. To assess Korean ENGOs with regards to this definition, this study will make use of an index of organizational sustainability known as the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI). Use of this index was once managed by the USAID (Better if you can say it was developed by USAID and is now run by FHI) and its use is now administered by an international nongovernmental organization known as FHI 360. This qualitative index serves the purpose to: "Address both advances and setbacks in seven key

components or “dimensions” of the sustainability of civil society sectors: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image” (FHI360, 2020, pp. 1). This study uses the seven indicators to examine the three themes: autonomy from the government, public perception, and agenda alignment. Due to the scope of this study, not every indicator is able to provide insight into all three themes, but each indicator provides insight into at least one.

The first indicator examined in the CSOSI (henceforth index) is the legal environment, which is defined by the FHI 360 as the laws and regulatory systems that govern how organizations can exist within said nation’s civil society sector (FHI 360, 2018, pp. 106) (**Table 1**). In the Korean case, registration under the NGO Support Law sets the legal environment for Korean ENGOs, and exploring how ENGOs perceive the benefits and restrictions of registration may provide insight into an organization’s autonomy and public image. The second indicator is the organizational capacity, which is the internal capacity of the sector to reach its goals. This study examines ENGOs as individual cases, rather than as an entire NGO sector, on how they address the components of organizational capacity including constituency building and addressing capacity gaps to assess the autonomy of Korean ENGOs. The third indicator examined in this study is financial viability, which is the variety of funding sources available to the NGOs within their sector. The financial viability indicator addresses autonomy, public image, and advocacy alignment of Korean ENGOS through the examination of their funding sources. The fourth indicator is advocacy, which is the ability of the CSO sector to influence the public opinion on policies. This indicator explains advocacy alignment by looking at agenda selection methods and advocacy strategies of the ENGOs in the study. This indicator also supports the importance of public image and autonomy of ENGOs in relation to advocacy. The fifth indicator examined in this study is service provision, which is

the ability of the sector to provide goods and services. The Korean ENGOs in this study all provide services to the public, business, or government sectors. This section evaluates autonomy, advocacy alignment, and public image. The sixth indicator examined in this study is sectoral infrastructure, which is the assortment of services available to NGOs that provide support to their sector by other sectors such as business, government, media, and international organizations. This section aims to reveal what services the ENGOs of this study identified as beneficial to their own organization or the Korean NGO sector overall. An examination of the services ENGOs receive elaborates on the autonomy, agenda alignment and public image of Korean ENGOs. The seventh indicator examined in this study is public image, which is society's perception of the CSO sector. For the purpose of this study, the scope of this section covers how ENGO believe their organization and agendas are perceived by the media, business, government, and public sectors. This final indicator addresses the autonomy, advocacy alignment, and public image.

Table 1: *Definition of Indicators that are adapted in this study. Adapted from FHI 360 CSOCI- Civil Society Organizations Sustainability Index. Source: FHI 360, 2018, pp. 108-114*

Indicators	***General Definitions***
Legal Environment	**The legal and regulatory environment governing the CSO sector and its implementation.** • Registration (formalized existence) • Operation (enforcement of laws) • State Harassment (freedom of operation) • Taxation • Access to Resources • Local Legal Capacity
Organizational Capacity	**The internal capacity of the CSO sector to pursue its goals.** • Constituency Building • Strategic Planning (setting goals and timeframes) • Internal Management • CSO Staffing • Tech Advancement

Financial Viability	**The CSO sector's access to various sources of financial support.** • Diversification (access to multiple funding sources) • Local support (domestic sources of funding) • Foreign support (foreign sources of funding) • Fundraising • Earned Income • Financial Management System
Advocacy	**The CSO sector's ability to influence public opinion and public policy.** • Cooperation with Local and Central government (access to decision-making process) • Political Advocacy Initiatives • Lobbying Efforts • Advocacy for CSO Law Reform
Service Provision	**The CSO sector's ability to provide goods and services.** • Range of Goods and Services • Responsiveness to the Community • Constituencies and Clientele • Cost Recovery (generate revenue via service provision) • Government Recognition and Support
Sectoral Infrastructure	**Support services available to the CSO sector.** • Intermediary Support Organizations and CSO Resource Centers • Local Grant Making Organizations • CSO Coalitions • Training (available to CSOs) • Intersectional Partnerships
Public Image	**Society's perception of the CSO sector.** • Media Coverage • Public Perception of CSOs (reputation among larger pop) • Government and business perception of CSOs • Public Relations (promoting image) • Self-Regulation (accountability and transparency)

II. Methodology

Case Study Methodology

This study is a case study of 11 ENGOs operating through Korea to address the question of how they have sustained their organizations over time. For the purpose of this study, a case study is defined as "an empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a "case"), set within its real-world context—especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 2009). This study is a multiple case study, meaning that the same

phenomenon, the CSOSI, will be examined across multiple cases as a "small-N study" (Yin, 1981, pp. 101). The 11 cases will be compared, using Yin's case-comparison method where "the entire explanation from each case is taken and compared with the explanation from another case" (pp. 108). The explanations of each cases in this study are explored and compared in order to provide a more robust picture of the organizational sustainability of ENGOs in Korea today.

As the study is limited to only 11 cases, the issues associated with small-N studies must be considered. Small-N cases are often nongeneralizable and cases are often hard to compare unless variables are carefully selected (Lijphart, 1971). In this study, only ENGOs operating in South Korea were selected and the seven factors from the CSOSI are being used to compare across these 11 cases of ENGOs. While the context provided by an individual case, or 11 cases, may not be generalizable to all ENGOs nor the entirety of the Korean NGO sector, this study systematically examines core issues that may pertain to politicization identified in the existing literature, including autonomy from the government, advocacy alignment, and public perception. Previous research on Korean ENGOs studies KFEM as a model for providng context to the situation of Korean ENGOs, thus this research aims to expand the number of ENGO cases examined in detail and with more nuance. Moreover, research involving interviews of Korean ENGO members only uses their data to back up general conceptions of the situation of ENGOs in Korea without showing a deeper exploration into any of their cases other than KFEM. This study will provide an in-depth analysis of the voices of Korean ENGOs that may not have been represented properly, if ever.

Sampling

The first consideration to make when conducting qualitative research, such as grounded theory, is the probability of sampling. Often qualitative researchers rely on nonprobability sampling, or nonrandom sampling, such as snowball sampling, which is the method of acquiring

samples based on a chain of relations (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, pp. 367). Using nonprobability sampling increases the bias in the results, which reduces the generalizability of the results. This study set out to reduce bias through the use of random sampling to best produce a dataset that is unbiased (pp. 359). However, as the researcher encountered challenges to the random sampling method, data in this study was collected using both random and nonrandom (snowball) sampling.

A second consideration for sampling in qualitative research is the sample size. It is important to acquire enough samples to allow the researcher to "uncover and understand the core categories" in their analysis (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, pp. 360). Some studies have shown that generally 20-30 respondents provide enough information to complete an analysis. Other studies have used as few as 10 informants and others as many as 70 (Bernard & Ryan, 2010; Kim, 2009). The target sample size for this study was 30 Korean ENGOs, however, due to a number of challenges, the primary data includes 14 in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted at 11 Korean ENGOs from August 2019 to September 2019 in Seoul, Busan, and Jeju Island in Korea. Random sampling of ENGOs for interviews was based on the following criteria:

1. Headquartered in Seoul or Busan (with one exception of an ENGO registered in Seoul, but headquartered on Jeju Island)
2. Registered to Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries, City of Seoul's Department of Environment or City of Busan's Department of Environment (with one exception of an international ENGO's Seoul office approved, but not registered by central government)
3. Registration information is accurate and ENGO is currently active

Seven interviews at seven organizations were conducted using random sampling. Two interviews were conducted with the same activist at one randomly sampled ENGO on different dates, as one

interview is an in-person follow-up interview conducted after an initial online interview. Five interviews at four different ENGOs were conducted using snowball sampling (**Table 2**). Random selection was done by first creating separate lists of ENGOs based on city listed in their registered address, of which the final list had approximately 250 ENGOs based on criteria 1 and 2. Next, each ENGO was assigned random numbers and then 30 ENGOs were randomly selected to be interviewed.

ENGO Name	***Registered to***	***Period Founded***	***Period Registered***	***Agenda (Most general)***	***Interviewee's Position***	***Sampling Method***
*Regional 1**	MOE	1998-2003	2003-2008	River issues	President **(Interviewed twice)**	Random
Regional 2	City	1993-1998	2003-2008	River issues	President	Random
Regional 3	City	2017-2020	2017-2020	Ocean issues, Environmental education	President	Random
Regional 4	MOE	2008-2013	2013-2017	Ocean issues, Animal welfare	Activist	Snowball
Seoul 1	City	2017-2020	2017-2020	Animal welfare	President	Snowball
Seoul 2	MOE	2003-2008	2003-2008	Environmental conservation	Vice President	Random
*Seoul 3**	MOE	1993-1998	1998-2003	Environmental conservation, Ocean issues	**Administrator, Activist 1, Activist 2**	Random, Snowball, Snowball
Seoul 4	City, MOE	2008-2013	2008-2013. 2017-2020	Environmental education	President	Snowball
Seoul 5	MOE	1988-1993	1998-2003	Environmental conservation	Activist	Random
Seoul 6	MOE	unknown	2008-2013	Environmental health and safety	President	Random
International 1	NA	2013-2017	NA	Ocean issues	Activist	Snowball

Table 2: *General information of 11 organizations, the 14 interviewees, and the sampling methods used to obtain each interview. *Multiple interviews were conducted with Regional 1 and Seoul 3 (see bolded information).*

There were many challenges to obtaining 30 randomly selected interviews. Challenges included the time restrictions (3-week window plus a few days to prepare with interpreters in all three cities), incorrect contact information on the registration lists, and objection to interviewing by the organization. In Busan, five out of 10 ENGOs contacted responded to interview requests. One interview was cancelled last minute, and another's availability conflicted with the interpreter's

availability, so three randomly selected ENGOs in Busan were interviewed. One interview was conducted in Jeju as a randomly selected ENGO registered in Seoul operates in Jeju and was available to interview in English and opted to not use an interpreter, so the researcher was able to conduct this interview on their own. In Seoul, many randomly selected ENGOs shared interest, but were either unresponsive for interview scheduling, or did not share availability with interpreters before the researcher left Korea and did not respond to further email inquiries. Phone, video, and finally email interviews were pursued in the place of in-person interviews in some cases, but all offers were rejected and thus constrained efforts to a small-N study.

Interview Methodology

For the purpose of this study, an in-depth, semi-structured interview is defined as an in-person interview in either English (three interviews) or Korean (eleven interviews), with an average duration of 60-90 minutes, and uses an interview guide containing pre-determined questions (**see Appendix I**) but in a flexible way to follow the natural progression of the interview (Dexter, 1970; Desai & Potter, 2006).

Limiting ENGOs to those with headquarters in Seoul and Busan was based on the size and locations of each city and because a majority of ENGOs are registered in either city. Seoul, located in the northwest, is the capital city of the Republic of Korea and is the largest city in Korea with a population of approximately 9.93 million (KOSIS, 2020). Busan, located in the southeast, is the second largest city in Korea with a population of 3.48 million. One interview was conducted on Jeju Island as an ENGO registered in Seoul has headquarters in Jeju Island. Jeju Island (*Jejudo*) is a self-governing island around 90 miles south of mainland Korea and has a population of approximately 641,000, but ENGOs registered to Jeju were not selected for this study due to low registration of ENGOs and availability of Korean language interpreters (**Figure 3**).



Figure 3: *Map of Korea showing the headquarter locations of ENGOS interviewed from August - September 2019. Map image from "Administrative divisions of South Korea" (Wikipedia, 2020)*

Cross-Cultural Interviewing

As all interviews are conducted in Korea and all interviewees and interpreters are Korean nationals, there are many factors to consider when doing in-person cross-cultural interviews. First, all in-person interviews were held at the offices of the ENGOs unless otherwise desired by the interviewee with some interviews taking place in local cafes. Language barriers and culture cues are major hurdles for cross-cultural interviewing as cautioned by Ryen (2001):

> "The problem may not necessarily be a matter of posing the right questions, but one of the researcher's communicating questions to the interpreter in culturally appropriate ways that invite further communications. It is of vital importance that words and concepts be interpreted in the same ways by interviewers, interpreters, and respondents to avoid violating validity." (Ryen, 2001, p. 12)

Because Korean is not the researcher's native language, interpreters who are native speakers and are knowledgeable about Korean NGOs and environmental issues assisted the researcher to lead interviews to obtain responses that are as pertinent to the questions as possible. The method of interviewing was discussed with each interpreter prior to beginning the interview stage. The questions contained in the interview guide (in both Korean and English) were explained by the researcher in the same manner to all interpreters. Interviews conducted in English were done without the presence of an interpreter, but the option to have one was given to the interviewees beforehand (Desai & Potter, 2006). In the case of Korean-language interviews, one single interpreter was assigned to each interview based on the location, and due to this restriction, some cases of scheduling conflict occurred.

All interviews were voice-recorded using a cellular device. Interview recording files were backed up digitally in case of technical difficulties. Before beginning all interviews, the researcher obtained oral confirmation that the interviewees agree to the interview and to being recorded anonymously. Each interview is assigned an identifier based on region of headquarter (Seoul, Regional, or International) and order of interview to maintain consistency and anonymity throughout the analysis process (**Table 2**).

Interview Guide Design

The 7 indicators from the CSOSI were adapted into 15 main questions and 13 follow up questions in an interview guide with 36 total questions. The 15 main questions were written to allow interviewees to provide open-ended responses that would target factors of each indicator. Examples of the questions targeting each of the 7 indicators can be seen in Table 2.

All interview questions were prepared in English first, then translated by a native speaker into Korean. Translations of questions were then discussed with the researcher and translator and

some adjustments were made. The Korean language guide was back-translated into English by a second bilingual, native Korean speaker with no prior knowledge of the English questions, and suggested adjustments were made. The finalized set of questions became the interview guide, helping organize or guide the flow of the interviews in either English or Korean by either the researcher or the interpreters. The researcher worked with three interpreters, one in Busan and two in Seoul. All interpreters were briefed on the research topic and interview guide prior to beginning interviews. All interpreters had prior knowledge on Korean environmental issues, but no connections to the ENGOs interviewed. Interviews conducted in English were done by the researcher alone without the assistance of an interpreter, and the researcher took notes throughout these interviews along with voice recordings. During interviews conducted in Korea, both the research and interpreters took notes during the interview along with voice recordings. The research and interpreters compared notes and discussed each interview immediately afterwards.

Final interview transcripts were written by the researcher with assistance from native Korean speakers. First, native Korean speakers transcribed the audio recordings first into Korean then the research translated the transcripts into English. Transcribers were provided the context of the study and the interview as well as were given the interview guide to help outline the transcripts. Inaudible or indecipherable parts of the interviews were removed. Korean language interviews conducted outside of Seoul were transcribed by a native Korean speaker with the same dialect as the interviewee and were adjusted to standard Seoul dialect. When the researcher had questions on translations, the transcriber or a bilingual Korean speaker provided assistance. The results are 14 English-language transcripts.

Analysis Methodology

The content of each interview transcript was analyzed using grounded theory methods. For the purpose of this study, grounded theory is defined as "inductive research [that] involves the search for pattern from observation and the development of explanations – theories – for those patterns through a series of hypotheses (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, pp. 266). A grounded theory analysis is applied in this study to find information based on the experiences of the interviewees. Interview questions were written using the seven CSOSI indicators, which then became the seven major code groups for the analysis. Theoretical coding was then applied to each indicator and 91 codes emerged (Holton, 2008) (see **Appendix II**). Using the constant comparative method, codes from each interview and organization were compared to find uniformity as well as unique cases. The results are divided by each of the 7 indicators and each ENGO represents one case. For example, quotes pertaining to indicator 1, legal environment, are first analyzed for how they pertain directly to the indicator, then compared to other quotes pertaining to the legal environment in other interviews. This process was repeated for each of the seven indicators and codes. Findings are reported as results in the following section

Additionally, through the use of the constant comparative method, three major hypotheses for the future of the ENGO sector in Korea are presented in the conclusion. These three hypotheses emerged from the themes of the historical analysis and the results of the interview analysis. While the hypotheses are based on a small-N study, they are open-ended topics of research, possibly for future large-N studies on Korean ENGOs or the Korean NGO sector overall.

III. Results

Indicator 1: Legal Environment

Registration

Benefits of Registration

All interviewees from registered ENGOs in this study mention that the ability to accept donations legally, a right provided by the NGO Support Law, is the main reason why their ENGO registered. Regional 4, a small and recently registered organization believes, “the only help that we get from registration is that we can legally get donation money and issue this receipt legally.” Without registration, ENGOs like Regional 4 would not be able to accept donations legally. The approval of registration provides ENGOs with the ability to collect donations, membership fees, and provide their supporters with receipts, which may be beneficial to a donor’s personal financial management. Regional 1, Regional 2, Regional 3, and Seoul 6 also recognize financial benefits such as collecting membership fees and donations as reasons for seeking registration; however, these four organizations also mention the right to receiving government funding through annual government-managed public-interest project competitions as an additional financial benefit to registration.

Seoul 5, a larger ENGO founded the decade after the Democratization movement, also emphasizes financial benefits as the most important reason for registration: “I'm on the campaign side, but I understand that [registration] has been technically introduced in terms of finance, neatly managing membership, and sponsorship.” The activist from Seoul 5 acknowledges that there could be other benefits aside from financial ones, such as allowing for more organized management of members. They believe that registration is most helpful for financial reasons, recognizing that without registration, they would not have public support. This interviewee believes the public

would not want to financially support and NGO that has not registered, and without legal status, their organization would not have been able to receive sponsorship or donations from the public. Registration benefits ENGOs by giving them the ability to accept funding legally, and this connection begins to address the significance of public financial support (membership fees) to the sustainability of these organizations.

The Korean branches of international NGOs must register at least to the Korean tax office to conduct fundraising in Korea. The only non-registered organization in this study, International 1, shares that because they perceived the only benefit of registration would have been to solicit donations from inside Korea, they chose not to register their branch in Korea. The activist running the organization's Korean office shares that all of their funding is managed centrally at their international headquarters and the funding is all from foreign sources outside of Korea. Because they do not fundraise in Korea, they do not see a need in registering. This organization's case appears to be unique as this activist explains the Korean tax office did not know what to do in this situation: "They haven't seen any international NGOs come in and set up their own office, not becoming a legal entity. So I just explained the letter of the law" (International 1). International 1 did not have financial needs when choosing to establish an office in Korea, met the minimum requirements of having an office address somewhere in Korea, and, therefore, had no need to register. A case such as International 1 does not appear to be common as the government offices in charge of managing registration had never experienced that situation, but international ENGOs have only recently begun to establish branches in Korea, so such organization may not be familiar to the government anyways.

Challenges to Registration

Opinions differ among ENGOs on the difficulty of achieving registered status. Some ENGOs feel that the process of registering was more difficult than they had expected because meeting the requirements of registration was more difficult than the actual approval process. Seoul 2, a large ENGO headquartered in Seoul that has been active for over a decade describes the requirements for registration as needing "one year's worth of preliminary activity" and "at least 100 members." On the difficulty of the process, the interviewee states, "Registration is always difficult." They say that difficulty in the process is to be expected because meeting the requirements a large hurdle to overcome before submitting the paperwork for the approval of a registered status.

Regional 3, which recently registered to their local city, agrees that the requirements are challenging, especially meeting the 100-member requirement, but so is the process of approval. When recruiting members pre-registration, Regional 3 had to ask people who sign their member list to remember the name of Regional 3 because they may receive a call from the government asking if they recognize it and are a member of it. If less than 100 people on the list claim to know of and support that organization, then they cannot complete the registration process. The interviewee, who is the president of Regional 3, has prior experience working as an activist in other ENGOs in Korea, and comments that the only difference they have seen in the registration process is that these days, the officials in charge are better at assisting organizations and telling them what they need to do. Without this knowledge, it is difficult.

The founder and president of Seoul 1, a recently founded and registered ENGO, shares their experience applying for registration around the time a high-profile case regarding misuse of the NGO Support Law made the process more difficult than they expected. Not only were they

new to the registration process, but there was more paperwork to complete because the "city was being very picky" (Seoul 1). The interviewee perceives the reason for this "pickiness" as being related to the incident of the former President, Park Geun-hye, whose "best friend collected a lot of money using fake nonprofits," and as this all came to light just before Seoul 1 planned on registering, they believe it to be the cause. They also do not believe that despite this pickiness and extra paperwork, registration is not an impossible task: "I don't think that it is unreasonable, and if the process is too easy, it can be another problem." This insight shows that despite recent political scandals involving NGOs, registration is still possible. Furthermore, if registration is too easy of a process, then there is a risk of more fake organizations achieving registration.

The perception of the government officials becoming stricter about registration requirements is summarized quite well by Seoul 2:

> "Maybe meeting the requirements is just hard in itself. These days, I don't think they are registering much with the central department or very often. Even the Ministry of Environment, even the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries, used to have a lot of pseudo-civil organizations (*gwanbyeon danchae,* 관변단체). There were quite a few organizations that had their names hanging on the wall and then just went away after doing some activity. Because of that, it's very strict about the requirements. It isn't about whether that was Lee Myung-bak or Park Geun-hye or Moon Jae-in. I think they are a bit strict about the conditions. It is not strictly based on the nature of the government." (Seoul 2)

According to the vice president of Seoul 2, who has almost 2 decades worth of experience in the Korean ENGO sector and went through registration in the early 2000's right before Lee's presidency began, this difficulty does not appear to be based on the different political

administrations. If one were to infer an impact of politicization of the NGO sector, then perhaps the ability to register would be hindered depending on the leading party. Instead, this interviewee's insight shows that they perceive the challenges to registration as due to the experiences multiple ministries have had with pseudo-civil organizations registering then staying dormant. It is possible that because organizations are registering yet failing to survive, the government has had to become stricter about ENGOs meeting these requirements. These organizations may have been encountered in this study during the random sampling portion of the methodology when several contact information from registration lists was either incorrect or led nowhere.

Each response is based on personal experience, but it is worth acknowledging that out of these experiences, there is an emerging polarized perception of the challenges to registration. ENGOs who experienced registration recently appear to have gone through a more rigorous process compared to those who registered prior to Lee Myung Bak's administration. The reasons for this shift remain a question for further study.

Indicator 2: Organizational Capacity

Constituency Building

For the ten registered organizations of this study, constituency building is related to registration requirements that state NGOs must build their membership to at least 100 individuals to register. The quality of membership is not dictated by the NGO Support Law, and registration can be approved for applicants who prove their members are real (Regional 3). Constituency building appears to be less important to International 1.

Need for Constituency Building

There is a financial connection between constituency building and registration that is observed in registered ENGOs. Their paying supporters, many of whom are the 100 members needed for registration, help provide for the salaries and wages of activists (Seoul 1, Seoul 5, Regional 4). Regional 4 is a small organization and their staff is made up of less than five full-time activists. They rely on their supporters to provide their minimum wage. They have met the 100-member requirement, yet they recognize that larger ENGOs with the same animal welfare agenda have "100 times" the financial support of Regional 4. Size of the organization does not appear to matter when relying on membership for salary support as Seoul 5, a larger and older organization has over 30 activist and staff wages that they could not pay without their membership fees.

Strategies for Constituency Building

Building on the connection between the 100-member requirement, Seoul 1 shares that most of their 100 supporting members are "working in the field" meaning that their constituency is made up of individuals who work in areas impacted by Seoul 1's agenda (animal welfare), "There are people who actually work for rescue centers or researchers who actually care." Seoul 1 has built their constituency off an agenda supported by those whose work is most impacted in the are`of

animal welfare. Maintaining a constituency that, while small in comparison to other ENGOs in this study, is highly impacted by the work they do, Seoul 1 can sustain their organization and carry out their advocacy strategies effectively. Having individual members of the industries impacted by Seoul 1's work (mainly policy making) may show one way that Korean citizens are able to raise their voices in a system where industry and government are dominant. This creates a feedback of support that benefits both the constituents and the ENGO.

Having a small constituency of which a majority of members are directly impacted by an organization's work is one path of constituency building ENGOs such as Seoul 1and Regional 3. It appears that older organizations in this study, such as Seoul 5, take a wider approach to building their constituency beyond paying members:

> "Supporters don't have to provide financial support, for example, they just go to Facebook and follow us. We do all kinds of things to gather support. We also do online campaigns, street ads, and meeting local residents and resident organizations. We also do a lot of press work." (Seoul 5)

Seoul 5 is an organization that was founded during the first five years after democratization and registered around the implementation of the NGO Support Law. The interviewee from Seoul 5 recognizes a difference between "supporter" and "member" as members pay fees for membership status to the ENGO, whereas supporters may just increase the numbers of visible support for the organization or its agenda. The interviewee shares that their organization takes various online and offline approaches to building support for their organization ranging from running social media campaigns on widely used platforms to attending resident's meetings in local areas. They also use the media, or "press," as an indirect route for obtaining support. Seoul 5 thus takes a diverse approach to building their constituency.

Seoul 3, an ENGO that was founded in the 1990s, and which is one of the larger organizations in this study, shares that they also use various online and offline campaigns to build interest in their organization and agendas. They use the media to raise issues and spread information about their organization to the public, as well. One interviewee from Seoul 3 shared that their supporters are very important to their advocacy:

> "Because our people [activists] are trustworthy, if we speak, our base listens. On another side, during the 1980s, the Minjung movement, their human network is having a good impact." (Seoul 3, activist 2)

Activist 2 perceives that the activists who make up Seoul 3 are trustworthy, and they have an impact because their constituency, or "base," listens to what activists have to say. In their statement, activist 2 mentions the *Minjung* movement and its ability to have an impactful network during the Democratization movement of the 1980s. As Seoul 3 is one of the earliest ENGOs to register in the pool of interviewees of this study, the invocation of the *Minjung* activists may show how they perceive their own longstanding network of supporters. Seoul 3 in just one example of an ENGO that has built trust with a large following from the public.

Limits to Constituency Building

Negative Outlook, a Lot of Action

Despite the trust they receive from their support base, activist 2 from Seoul 3 worries about the momentum of ideological support from the Korean public beyond their base:

> "This is my worry…This organization, how should I say it? It is an environmental NGO, but as I said earlier, Korean society has a special characteristic where it feels like it can't really focus on just environmental issues. We can solve environmental issues through politics, but on the other side, I feel that just doing that will not

> change the world. In what way can I make people more concerned about environmental issues? It is a big concern. There are organizations that are really good at that. Whether that's Greenpeace or WWF. Those places really use billions of won on promotional expenses and make a lot of content." (Seoul 3, activist 2)

Activist 2 is worried that, while there are ways for them to improve the environment through political action, they do not know how to build environmental consciousness in the Korean public. This worry translates to a fear for the future of their agenda if they cannot make such change happen. The activist signals that the extent to which an organization can reach out and promote their agenda appears to have financial limitations, and they compare Seoul 3 to Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) which are relatively large, globally recognized ENGOs. These two international organizations have only recently arrived in Korea (Greenpeace in 2011 and WWF in 2014). These organizations entered Korea with an already established global base and larger budgets than some of the largest Korean ENGOs according to the activist from Seoul 5. The use of comparison to these organizations may indicate an emerging sense of inferiority that even a relatively large and established ENGO such as Seoul 3 perceives that they now have strong competitors for building a domestic constituency in Korea. Moreover, this activist worries that Korean society cares very little about the national environmental agenda, and they perceive it may take a backseat to international agendas.

No Outlook, No Action

The activist from International 1 believes because their organization only has an international support base, and therefore, only an international agenda, it does not represent the Korean public's ideology. The activist reflects on their organization's public image and financial

limits to recruiting a support base in Korea. They do so in a comparison to another international ENGO, also referenced by Seoul 3. They share:

> "We don't have any public facing campaign in Korea. [We are] very small. We're not like Greenpeace. Who cares, right? …We don't have the resources to do a lot of public facing campaigns. So in Korean we don't do fundraising. I don't think any public knows us." (International 1)

Working for this international ENGO, the interviewee shares that they do not have a support base in Korea because their organization does not conduct public campaigns like Seoul 3 and Seoul 5. They also cannot afford to partake in fundraising within Korea, and they, therefore, have not been able to build a constituency base in Korea. The activist mentions that the headquarters has a support base, but this indirect support base from outside of Korea does not interact with the Korean public. They compare their organization to Greenpeace to show the difference in organizational sustainability, where Greenpeace Korea has invested finance into public campaigns and registered with the Korean tax office in order to accept donations from within Korea, International 1 has done neither. Perhaps the activists from International 1 do not see a reason to conduct public campaigns and fundraise because their organization plans on dissolving its Korean branch in the next year or so (from the interview in 2019). Greenpeace, on the other hand, may have a goal of expanding and staying in Korea. If that is Greenpeace Korea's goal, it may be why they place money into campaigns and accept donations domestically. Meanwhile, International 1 will continue to work on its advocacy strategies without a domestic support base until they must close their office.

Positive Outlook, Little Action

Another challenge to building constituency that Regional 4 sees is the limitation of their workforce's capacity. With a workforce of less than five individuals making them unable to invest

effort into public relations, the activist from Regional 4 believes the popularity of their agenda must be what gives them the large number of supporters. Regarding the large support they have managed to attract relative to their small workforce, the activist shares, “I can't believe all of those people are trying to donate all of that money every month. We don’t do anything specifically for them” (Regional 4). They agree that the future of their agenda has a positive outlook, but they are not planning to grow their organization larger. While they are not active in promoting their organization, their growth may continue to occur naturally over time. ENGO, Regional 4, is quite small compared to Seoul 3 (**Table 4**) but is about the same in workforce size as Seoul 1. Both organizations share the same agenda (animal welfare) but follow very different advocacy strategies. Regional 4 focuses on demonstrations while Seoul 1 focuses on research and policy. Both organizations recognize the growing interest the Korean public has in animal welfare, and they attribute their support to that interest rather than the results from the campaigns that they run. This is unlike large ENGOs such as Seoul 3 who worries about the future interest in their agenda.

ENGO	SIZE CATEGORY	EST. SIZE
REGIONAL 1	Small	<10 employees
REGIONAL 2	Small	<10 employees
REGIONAL 3	Small	<10 employees
REGIONAL 4	Small	<10 employees
INTERNATIONAL 1	Small	<10 employees
SEOUL 1	Small	<10 employees
SEOUL 6	Small	<10 employees
SEOUL 4	Medium	10-30 employees
SEOUL 2	Large	>30 employees
SEOUL 3	Large	>30 employees
SEOUL 5	Large	> 30 employees

Table 4: *ENGO size of workforce is broken down into three categories. These estimated ranges are based on size of workforce in Korea, observed at the offices, from reports, or inferred from interviews and NGO websites.*

Addressing Capacity Gaps

Other components examined in this study, related to organizational capacity, are the ways ENGOs address capacity gaps in terms of non-financial resources including data, equipment, expert knowledge, or other technology and tools. All ENGOs express that they have gaps in their capacity, but there are two emerging methods ENGOs take to address these gaps: 1) stay within the boundaries of their abilities, and 2) addressing gaps by expanding their network.

Stay within Boundaries

A smaller, newer ENGO, Regional 3, appears to stay within the boundaries of what they can on a low budget, and this helps them advocate for their agenda. If they receive government funding for a project, they make as many copies of their materials as possible, maximizing what they can get with the financial assistance. Instead of building networks with businesses or other NGOs, they apply for government funding when they are missing key items such as tools for projects. Most of their advocacy, however, appears to be low cost and their activities usually require nothing but labor and time. Their materials are often collected during their volunteer activities, and education materials are made out of these items. The president of Regional 3 shares:

> "Of course there are! There are but when I receive public-interest project funding for things like education materials, it is in order to make them into volumes. We survey the waste we collect, we clean it, we dry it…and we make education materials out of it. So, we do that too… We study about the presents that we are gifted from the ocean and the shame that we give to the ocean." (Regional 3)

Address Gaps by Expanding Network

A more long-running, larger ENGO, Seoul 2, uses a variety of methods to address gaps, but does so in a way that is specialized for each agenda. This organization has a much wider agenda

portfolio, but they also recognize that when an agenda calls for action beyond their capacity, they can refer to their network of NGOs, experts, and even the central government and ministries to fill in the gaps:

> "We use all of those (network of experts specialized in specific areas of technology or expertise). It depends on the issue. For some issues, we meet in person with the Ministry of the Environment, and we sometimes use a network of experts for positions that require experts. Depends on the level of agreement on the agenda. Like before, there are times when we gather at the Prime Minister's office (*chongnishil*; 총리실) or gather at the ministries. We use all of the methods possible." (Seoul 2)

Relying on these networks demonstrates that Seoul 2 is aware of their limits and has cultivated connections throughout their evolution as an organization. Older ENGOs that have sustained themselves since the 1990s, such as Seoul 3 and Seoul 5, also use expansive networks of NGOs, experts, and government officials to address gaps in their organizational capacity. Their openness to filling gaps in capacity by working with the Ministry of Environment and the Prime Minister's office is reminiscent of the close ties with the progressive civilian presidencies from 1993 until 2008; however, it is important to note that none of the ENGOs in this study mention their network including direct ties to the Korean Blue House as these connections were severed during President Lee's administration (2008-2013). As these older organizations have sustained themselves throughout the 1990s and the rise of the conservative movements, it appears that their agenda networks have diversified. More on the networks these organizations create will be explored under indicator 6, sectoral infrastructure.

Indicator 3: Financial Viability

Government Funding

The ENGOs in this study have range of funding sources (**Table 3**), with all relying on membership fees and then at least one additional source or more. The second most mentioned funding source is government funding, which comes in the form of public-interest project funding by cities or ministries. While government funding was not officially reported in any financial reports, the ENGOs who mention government funding fall into one of three trends: 1) shift towards receiving government funding, 2) shift away from government funding, and 3) stability of financial management without government funding.

Table 3: *Sources of funding of each ENGOs. Official financial reports were found through ENGO websites and were not always uniform. Categories were selected to best represent these differences, but it is recognized that there is room for discretion. Boxes marked with an X indicate that these sources were mentioned in interviews, but not evident in the most recently published financial reports (in some cases financial reports were not provided or available).*

ENGO NAME	MEMBER FEES	DONA-TIONS	SPONSOR-SHIPS	BUSINESS REVENUE	FOUND-ATIONS	BUSINESS DONATION	GOVT. (PUBLIC-INTEREST)	INT'L FUNDING	OTHER	SOURCES
REGIONAL 1	X						**X**			Interview
REGIONAL 2	X				X		X			Interview
REGIONAL 3	30%						70%			Interview
REGIONAL 4	46%			<34%					<16% Misc., 5% Carryover	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 1	28%	2%			X				61% Carry-over, 9% Misc.	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 2	X	57%		41%			X	X	2%	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 3	36%		22%	28%	X	2%	X	X	5% Misc., 7% Regional Funding	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 4	7%			36%	50%	5%	X		2%	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 5	<63%	X	X	<5%	X	<19%, <14%		X	<1%	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 6	X	X	X				X			Interview
INT'L 1								100%*		Interview, Financial Report (2018)

* International funding includes international grants, charitable donations, foundations, investments, and membership donations, which are all handled and distributed from the central headquarters according to 2018 Financial Report.

Shifting towards Government Funding

Based on interview responses, Regional 1 appears to rely only on membership fees and government project grants. Over the past decade, Regional 1 has continuously conducted river monitoring projects using their own funding, but the interviewee mentions that this funding, which was originally only sourced from membership fees, has not been enough to continue the project. Reginal 1 had to shift towards additional funding sources to find a way to sustain their advocacy work. For the previous two years, they have come to rely on the government funding to fulfill the costs of maintaining their river monitoring project. The president of the organization recognizes that there are difficulties in funding those projects on their own. They elaborate on their funding and the burden they have taken on as president when asked,

> "Because we're doing a public-interest project, it can never go to personal expenses. It's only for project expenses. It cannot be used to support people's activities or things like that. So even though you have to gather all of these membership fees, if you receive 1 million won in support, in the case of [this city], that would be 20%. In our case, there are 100 members making direct deposits. I get 1 million won each time, so I can pay for activities. And that's how I received 3 million won in support each time from the city." (Regional 1)

Regional 1 provides an example of how public-interest funding is structured. Their organization receives 80% of the project budget through the government and the other 20% is funded by the organization. This source of funding is the collection of membership fees, which is a legal right provided by registration. Without these membership fees, they would not have been able to sustain their project long-term. But, by only having one source of funding, their organizational sustainability was put at risk when less membership fees were being paid. The choice to apply for

public-interest project funding from the government guaranteed the sustainability for the years the funding was granted, but it may not have guaranteed their autonomy. The president organization now believes they have become too reliant on government funding. The interviewee recognizes that government has financially taken over their organization. Government funding is strictly limited to project-related needs rather than compensation for their workforce or volunteers, and because the government funds cannot be used for personal expenses or to pay individuals for their labor, the ENGO must rely on what membership fees they can accumulate to cover those remaining costs.

The stipulation that government funding cannot be used for personal expenses does not necessarily confine Regional 1 to a certain agenda, but it does limit their ability to create plans for the future. Regional 1 showcases that ENGOs that rely mostly on government funds to sustain their projects are worrying about the future of their organization. Without the government support, their long-term project would not continue; they would not be able to advocate for their agenda.

An organization registered recently, within the two years prior to the interview, Regional 3 secures 70% of its annual budget from government funding through public-interest project funding, substantially more than their own membership fees (30%). They hope to change this ratio soon. The president explains that their organization receives funding for buying equipment for their activities, which is relatively inexpensive (a few million won). The equipment is used for activities that benefit the public and is reused from one beach cleanup to the next. Other uses of these government funds include providing services to their target constituents, who are often elementary, middle, and high school students. Connected through charity organizations, Regional 3 provides the students with extracurricular education opportunities they would otherwise not have access to: “If we receive public offering project funding, we help those friends fund snacks, the

education is free, and transportation" (Regional 3). In Korea, afterschool education is common for students, even on the weekends; however, these programs are for-profit academies (*hagwon* or 학원) and low-income families may not be able to afford such programs. This is then a service Regional 3 is able to provide for their community using government financial support.

Public-interest projects are funded with the purpose of providing public benefits, such as a clean environment or afterschool education. In Regional 3's case, their activities serve two additional purposes, both of which directly benefit the government. First, their clean-up activities serve as volunteer opportunities for the students, who receive volunteer points that can be used to improve their overall student scores, and public servants, who may receive community recognition for their volunteer activities. Second, the waste collected from their beach clean ups is counted and recorded into monthly reports that are sent to the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries (MOF) which, according to the interviewee, recently helped the MOF obtain funding a few billions of won (or millions of USD). Regional 3 appears to rely on government project funding for amounts that seem small compared to the financial benefit the MOF received in return. Their close ties between government funding and service provision may serve as an example of an ENGO at risk of co-operation, but Regional 3 is still new, and their agenda has, since its inception, been ocean environmental education and cleanup. The suggestion co-opting has occurred, could be challenged.

Despite Reginal 3's unbalanced reliance on government funding, they are aware that it shows a weakness in their sustainability as an organization. The president recognizes that the sustainability of their organization is related to their ability to receive government funding, "But now, without public-interest project funding, we are lacking. If two of our teachers have jobs… then the work dies off." While they find meaning in their work, they cannot continue their advocacy without the government funding. According to the interviewee, this is a frustration of

theirs because they compare their situation to that of activists outside of Korea who "don't worry about money and they can just do what they want because they receive a lot of money, receive a salary." They perceive that it is a uniquely Korean trait that activists cannot make a salary through their work, and instead the organization must rely on the government. In doing so, they recognize that "if there's money given from the nation or city, we end up depending on that. We can't do what we want." The interviewee believes that this reliance on government funding is inevitable in Korea, perhaps because of the lack of incoming membership fees. The only way out of this dilemma other than increasing membership may be to appeal to businesses for donations or sponsorships, but the challenge is to find businesses that would invest in a small, new ENGO.

In Seoul, the president of Seoul 6 shares that their organization relies on donors and sponsors, but that is not enough. Like Seoul 3, the interviewee from Seoul 6 feels that there is something unique about Korean NGOs in that they cannot sustain their organization on just membership fees, "As far as I know, not a single civic group in our country runs exclusively on membership fees only." Seoul 6 has also had to turn to the government for financial support. Like Regional 1 and Regional 3, Seoul 6's sustainability is directly linked to government funding. Because they can only rely on donations and membership fees to the extent of coving living costs, in order to carry out projects, Seoul 6 has had to apply for government funding to cover the costs of projects. Like Regional 1 and 3, it appears that their ability to do the work they want to do is limited financially. And because there is such a limit with membership, they also apply for funding in the form of public-interest projects from the central government. Like the two regional ENGOs who have a similar method, Seoul 6's president is aware of the negative aspects associated with receiving government funding stating:

> “I can't use my voice to speak out if I get government funding. If I make a sound, they won't give it to me next time. Truthfully, us civil society organizations can’t just register anywhere. Because registration itself can damage the autonomy of civil society organizations. If you register, you can go to a government affiliated agency and when you get money from it, it’s nothing but a function of advocacy.” (Seoul 6)

Seoul 6’s president perceives that there is risk of registering with the government and then accepting government funding to organizations in that they will lose their voices and their autonomy. They perceive a second risk related to the government, which is that if they do speak out against the government, they will not be able to receive funding again. This statement speaks to the period during President Lee Myung Bak’s presidency when he and the National Assembly prohibited NGOs from receiving government funding if they protested government actions. This direct prohibition of NGOs shows the embeddedness of the two sectors. If ENGOs are on the side of the government, then they can receive financial support, which this interviewee makes clear is necessary to have as no organization can survive on donations alone. Seoul 6 claims to be a “pure civil society organization,” and they receive government funding. In this case, their support for the government may or may not have won them funding, but if they had spoken out against the Moon Presidency, would they have lost their chances? The results of the 2019 MOIS public-interest projects report shows that Seoul 6 received a grant that covered 95% of the project costs (MOIS, 2019). The organization itself had to cover 5% of the total costs, which was just over 2,000,000 won. According to the report, they successfully met their 2019 project goals and were slightly under budget. This report provides insight into how an ENGO can receive and use government funding to supplement their project costs to a significant degree, but it does not explain the extent

to which agendas or projects had been designed with the government's agenda in mind. Based on the responses of the interviewee, it is possible that in this case, aligned agendas were intentional.

Shifting away from Government Funding

Regional 2, a small organization that was founded after democratization, has seen a transition in how they take in funding. Like Regional 1, Regional 2 also has received public-interest project funding from the government. The extent to which they rely on public-interest project funding has decreased. They have had to adapt their financial management by finding new sources of funding as government funding became strict, "In the past they gave recognition to the intangible costs. But from about 10 years ago they stopped." This statement is a demonstration of the changes made a decade ago, under conservative President Lee, which made the government stricter about funding NGOs. Furthermore, the interviewee perceives a change in how the government recognizes fundable components of projects. Expertise and labor are included as intangible line items that Lee's government discontinued funding. This change made Regional 2 shift away from government funding towards foundations.

According to the interviewee, foundations often cover labor costs at a fixed percentage. While this is only a single case of this shift, it shows that the organizational sustainability of Regional 2 was impacted by the changes made to NGO funding under Lee. Employees' wages are covered by membership fees, but when taking on a public-interest project, the extra labor costs were zeroed. Rather than accepting the losses, Regional 2 searched for funding solutions and diversified their sources by applying for grants at foundations. They have since been able to continue their advocacy work.

Stability of Funding Sources (without Government Funding)

Seoul 1 is another ENGO from this study that recognizes that there is a limit that ENGOs risk crossing if they accept certain funding. This organization relies mostly on membership fees and foundations, but they seek funding where they provide a service in exchange for payments. For example, they published articles for a certain time period on behalf on a foundation to receive 3 million won. In another case, they wrote and published a book to receive funding along with revenue from book sales. The president chooses foundations based on their ability to complete projects and the agenda of the foundation. In short, Seoul 1 does not apply for government funding, and instead applies to foundations irregularly to supplement their budget on top of membership fees. While there is no risk for government co-option, financially, the downside to this kind of financial management structure is that it is a less reliable structure for the organization, "Well actually this kind of money is not consistent. So it changes like every year." They are also a newly founded and registered organization, so Seoul 1 is still working on stabilizing their finances. If they are not able to plan far in advance, then their organizational sustainability is at risk.

Contrary to Seoul 1, one of the largest and oldest ENGO headquartered in Seoul, Seoul 3, appears to have a much more reliable form of financial management. According to Seoul 3's administrator their organization relies on membership fees for one third of their budget. They also rely on one-time, large donations, business donations, and international funding (the sources of which are unclear). It is interesting to note that an ENGO with such a large budget and long-standing history in the Korean environmental movement relies heavily on membership, to some extent on international funding and business funding, but not at all on government funding (in 2019). According to the Seoul 3 administrator it is the smaller organizations that rely more on government funding than membership fees, which is evident with Regional 1, Regional 3 and

Seoul 6. Government funding appears to be an option to Seoul 3, as the administrator believes it is a benefit of registration, but it is not listed on their 2019 financial report. Whether this amount of government funding is small, or nonexistent, it is clear that Seoul 3 has been able to sustain itself over nearly three decades by relying mainly on membership fees, donations, and their own business revenues. As one of the few organizations in this study who elaborated on their business revenues, Seoul 3 shared that their president holds a separate business license which is registered at the tax office. This allows the operation of businesses, and for profits to be turned over to the organization. While other organizations interviewed in this study did not go into details on how they obtain business revenue, Seoul 2, Seoul 4, Seoul 5 and Regional 4 all reported business revenue on their 2019 financial reports.

Funding from Businesses

Funding from businesses comes in the forms of designated[4] (*jijeong gibugeum* or 지정 기부금) or undesignated[5] (*bijijeong gibugeum* or 비지정 기부금) sponsorships. Designated sponsorships are acceptable only for organizations engaging in specific arenas such as social welfare or education and undesignated sponsorships are for "other" contributions. Some of the ENGOs in this study are more open to building financial relationships than others. It should be noted that business sponsorships are not the same as business revenue, which is the revenue that comes into to an organization through business projects ENGOs take on such as selling merchandise, books, or education materials.

[4] "This refers to donations of public interest to corporations (organizations) (법인/단체) engaged in social welfare, culture, arts, education, religion, charity, etc." Ju Hye-jin. (2010). Tax treatment of contributions. In March Volume of Sangjang. Korean Listed Companies Association. Retrieved from: http://www.klca.or.kr/KLCADownload/eBook/P6895.pdf?Mode=PC

[5] "Donations other than those designated for legal and special contributions are called non-designated donations. For example, contributions to credit cooperatives, *Saemaul* Vault (새마을 금고), or political parties are of interest (Lawmaker 24-36-12)." Ibid

Acceptance of Business Donations

A medium sized ENGO is Seoul 4, whose founder and president shares that their organization relies on business revenue in exchange for corporate social responsibility (CSR) consulting, which is a service they provide to businesses such as large, family-owned conglomerates, or *chaebol* 재벌. This direct work with the businesses allows for Seoul 4 to take in over a third of their budget. According to their 2019 annual financial report, 50% of their donations were sourced by foundations funded by the conglomerates they assist. As Seoul 4's budget in 2019 was the largest out of the organizations in this study (over 2 billion won), it is a unique case of heavy business investment. When discussing their financial relationship with businesses in more detail, the president shares how they have built their network:

> "If we work with businesses, if we do it once, we keep growing bigger. We keep getting bigger and so does the money, and we can last longer. But if we want to do that anytime, we need to be satisfied with each other. If they are satisfied, then we are satisfied, right? So we have to have a win-win partnership." (Seoul 4, president)

For the relationship with businesses to be a win-win partnership, then as the ENGO receives financial support, the business must receive something just as valuable in return. It can be speculated that businesses receive something tangible, such as CSR consulting services or tax cuts, or something intangible, such as an improved image, or reputation of generosity resulting from donating to an environmental cause. Another possibility is the marketing that could come from sponsorships. The network of generous businesses that their ENGO's president has built is be a very successful financial management strategy. It has allowed the organization to grow over the

decade from the time it was established to when it was registered with the Ministry of the Environment, within the two years prior to the interview.

When considering that Seoul 4 has almost a decade of growth and only recently registered, it might be expected that the organization would have done so to reap the benefits of registration by applying for government project funding. However, they appear to have only rarely done because "it is difficult, but rather than that, for me, if it is just for things like a name or awards, then the program, the government should just be trustworthy." The trustworthiness of the government appears to be an important factor to the president of Seoul 4. While they may not receive government funding, it is important to note that this organization has collaborated with the Ministry of Environment and the United Nations on large projects relating to environmental education that have given Korea recognition at the international level, which is reminiscent of the 1992 UN Rio Conference. It is possible that this national and international legitimacy provides businesses with the trust they need to donate so largely to this organization.

Tales of Caution Working with Business

While Seoul 4 separates their business donations from business-sponsored foundations, Seoul 5's 2019 financial report shows a large percentage of business donations. In the report, Seoul 5's business donations totaled 32% of their annual budget (<19% from designated sponsorships, <14% from undesignated sponsorships). While the meaning of the differences between the two types of business sponsorships will not be elaborated on in this study, what is significant is the extent to which ENGO Seoul 5 received this support compared to the other ENGOs in this study. The activist from Seoul 5 explains that their organization receives different funding based on different agendas. As for businesses funding:

> "We receive separate corporate sponsorships. It is nice when companies fund projects, like a foundation, to pay for [environmental protection] because they want to spend money on protecting the [environment]. There are cases where they give us money. So then in that case, the money is used for related business." (Seoul 5)

Seoul 3 and Seoul 5 are both large ENGOs in Seoul that are from the same era post-democratization, but Seoul 3's reliance on business is negligible. In comparison, Seoul 5 appears to have adapted to sourcing their funding based on their agendas. Seoul 5 is the earliest founded ENGO in this study, and this longevity may be due to their diversification of agendas and financial sources. At the same time, their experience and network building may inform their methods of obtaining funding from so many different sources. For campaigns, they prefer foundations and for environmental protection at the DMZ they receive business sponsorships. It is curious to note that these business donations go towards supporting an internationally political topic, the boarder with North Korea. As Seoul 5 also does peace work (more in indicator 4, advocacy) perhaps businesses are donating to this agenda for specific reasons related to either political opinions or indirect support for the Korean government as Seoul 5's work in the DMZ provides services that benefits the central government as well as international relations with North Korea.

Business Revenue and International Funding

The remaining cases, Regional 4, Seoul 2, and International 1 provide other unique insights into the financial viability of Korean ENGOs. Seoul 2 relied heavily on two main sources of funding, donations (57%) and business revenue (41%). The remaining 2% of their 2019 annual budget was miscellaneous funding. It must be noted that while in the financial report, they state

"donation" (gibugeum or 기부금) but in the interview, when asked about their financial management, their vice president states:

> "Members provide sponsorship, and we hold regular fund-raising events once a year… And then we're doing a project with a research company…Some are from the government... Google Impact Challenges. There are times when we've done very big projects." (Seoul 2)

Seoul 2 is another case where the reliance on government funding is mentioned in the interview but is not clearly delineated in their 2019 financial report. The sources of funding mentioned are diverse and appear to be project or agenda based, similar to Seoul 5. The activist from Seoul 2 is aware that there are different levels of governance at which they can receive funding to work on projects or collaborate, from local to city to national level. When speaking about these levels of governance, it seems to be for project collaboration, which can also be observed for Seoul 2 receiving funding from international businesses such as Google. These two sources, government and international business, do not appear to be significant to the budget, but the projects themselves may be. The revenue taken in must be from the results of these projects, but that remains unclear. As a large and long-standing ENGO, Seoul 2 may have the capacity to work on such large projects without significant financial gain or financial ties as their budget relies on a dedicated membership and donor base.

Regional 4, relies mostly on membership fees (46%) and business revenue (< 34%). Regional 4's case is unique in that they are the only ENGO headquartered outside of Seoul in this study that does not use government funding, and never has. While this may not be a special case across the entirety of the ENGO sector in Korea, it is evidence that not all regional ENGOs rely on government financial assistance. Regional 4 has a small workforce and they are not looking to

expand. They have a relatively medium-sized budget, comparable to Seoul 1, who has a similar agenda and workforce size. Regional 4, does have a greater reliance on membership fees than Seoul 1. This may show that the advocacy strategies are more impactful on attracting public support.

International Funding Sources

As for international ENGOs operating in Korea, International 1 claims that they are a unique case in Korea because the organization is not registered as an NGO to the Korean government. Because International 1 is not registered, it cannot legally collect donations within Korea. It relies solely on its headquarters abroad for funding. The most-up to-date financial report for this organization shares that their project was allocated just under $2,000,000 USD[6]. Overall, the headquarters designated the largest portion of their project budget to this specific ocean agenda – the next largest project is just 11% of that. The Korea office has a small workforce of less than five activists, and they claim that they are able to get by with what they receive from the headquarters. Their agenda is very narrow, and their tasks are projected to only last until the year 2020 depending on conditions in Korea and in other countries, therefor collecting donations would not impact their sustainability or autonomy in Korea.

Perception of Size of Budget

All ENGOs in this small-N study perceive their budgets to be too small, but most make do with what they have (see **Table 5** for estimated annual budgets). Some ENGOs determine which sources of funding to obtain based on certain agendas or activities and others relying on less stable or less diverse management systems. In Korea, financial management begins with membership

[6] Estimated value in USD as exchanged from currency used in the 2018 Financial Report. Amount exchanged using 2018 average exchange rates Retrieved from https://www.xe.com/

fees. All registered organizations in this study rely, to some extent, on membership fees. Most commonly these fees are stated to go towards wages, labor costs, and costs of living (such as office rental). The requirement for ENGOs to have at least 100 supporters to register under the NGO Support Law (2000) seems to encourage them to plan the minimum extent to which they can sustain their organization meeting the basic needs – this is also recognizes that NGO-work in Korea is not done in exchange for living wage.

Table 5: *Scale of budge of each ENGO as of 2018 or 2019 (depending on most recently released reports). Small budgets are defined as less than 50,000,000 won (which is approximately less than $50,000 USD), medium budgets are defined as less than 200,000,000 won (approximately less than $200,000 USD), large budgets are defined as less than 400,000,000 won (approximately less than $400,000 USD), and very large budgets are defined as greater than 1,000,000,000 won (approximately more than $1,000,000 USD).*

ENGO NAME	SCALE OF YEARLY BUDGET	EST. SIZE OF ANNUAL BUDGET IN KOREAN WON*	SOURCE
REGIONAL 1	Small	<50,000,000	Interview
REGIONAL 2	Small	<50,000,000	Interview
REGIONAL 3	Small	<50,000,000	Interview
REGIONAL 4	Medium	<200,000,000	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 1	Medium	<200,000,000	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 6	Medium	<200,000,000	Interview, MOIS Report (2019)
INT'L 1	Medium	<200,000,000	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 2	Large	<400,000,000	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 3	Very Large	>1,000,000,000	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 4	Very Large	>1,000,000,000	Financial Report (2019)
SEOUL 5	Very Large	>1,000,000,000	Financial Report (2019)

* $1.00 USD = 1,105.46 KRW as of November 29, 2020 (https://www.xe.com/)

After meeting basic needs to sustain themselves, ENGOs must continue to gain members and diversify their funding to take on projects or activities. From this point, there is a divergence in paths of organization sustainability. One common path among Korean ENGOs that emerges is financial reliance on the government, which continues to exist both in and outside of Seoul, with some ENGOs leaning towards government support and others leaning away from it. The extent to

which large-sized, large-budget ENGOs rely on government funding represents only a small portion of their budgets compared to membership, business donations, and business revenue. Government funding in these large organizations is not categorized separately on examined financial reports, suggesting it may be so small as to have not even existed in the fiscal year of 2019.

Financial reliance on the government of some ENGOs with small income from membership fees, such as Regional 1, Regional 3 and Seoul 6, appears to result in an uneven balance of funding resulting in a greater reliance on government financial resources. These three ENGOs all perceive the funding they receive from the government as necessary to carrying out projects closely linked to their own agendas; however, they also all perceive some risk in accepting government funding. It appears to be challenging to receive and some ENGOs worry about their autonomy if they rely too much on government support.

Some ENGOs are distancing themselves from government financial reliance. This is evident in Regional 2, which describes their shift moving away from government funding to foundations due to the increase in strictness on fundable project components and a decrease in funding for the value of labor and time in the government's evaluation of projects. Environmental NGOs in this study with large budgets tend to rely little on government funding, if at all, which may indicate a move away from government funding, but that is uncertain without studying the financial viability of more organizations. What is certain is that these ENGOs rely so little, if at all, that they do not report government assistance in their official 2019 financial reports.

A final and fourth aspect of financial reliance on the government is with ENGOs that do not rely on the government at all, such as Regional 4, Seoul 1, Seoul 5, and International 1. Neither Seoul 1 nor Seoul 5 mention any reliance on government funding online, in their interviews or in

their 2019 financial reports. These two organizations are very different in size, longevity, budget, and agenda, so it is not an easy answer as to why they do not seek government funding. Further studies may be able to compare the changes in ENGO's choices to not seek government funding and the resulting impacts of reliance on government funding of ENGOs leaning in that direction.

Indicator 4: Advocacy

Agenda Setting

If advocacy is the ability of an organization to influence public policy, then several of the ENGOs in this study exemplify its practice. There are four categories of motivators that ENGOs in this study have used to determine their main agendas: 1) ideation based on personal interests, 2) finding gaps in society, 3) pursuing agendas historically rooted in democratization, and 4) evolving from the conservative movement of the early 2000s. Environmental NGOs Regional 2, Regional 4, International 1, Seoul 1, Seoul 2, Seoul 3, and Seoul 5 all advocate for policy changes across an array of agendas (**Table 6**). The four others resist advocating for policy making, with some claiming it is too political.

Personal Interest

The first emerging motivator of an ENGO's agenda setting is to pursue the interests and professional backgrounds of the founders and activists. This method is exemplified by Regional 1, an organization that, according to their founder, is influenced neither by the government nor businesses. They are made up of pure volunteers who "love earth and…protecting a blue sky, sea, green rivers and mountains…" (Regional 1). Besides advocating for environmental conservation, they also act as local volunteers when natural disasters occur to assist people impacted and prevent further damage to the environment. Their second agenda, natural disaster relief, stems from the background and interest of the members, who have experience in search-and-rescue and as professional divers, sailors, and construction workers.

Table 6: *The main agendas of each ENGO in this study, the scale to which their agendas are directed at targeting, and to which level of government they registered. Agendas have been generalized to maintain anonymity. This figure is informed by interviews and information gathers on ENGO's official websites or blogs in the Korean language.*

ENGO NAME	MAIN AGENDA	SCALE	REGISTERED TO
REGIONAL 1	Natural disaster relief, River issues	Local, National	MOE
REGIONAL 2	Ecological conservation and preservation, River Issues, Pollution, Biodiversity	Local, National	City
REGIONAL 3	Ocean Pollution, Environmental education	Local, National, International	City, MOE
REGIONAL 4	Ocean issues, animal welfare, Pollution	Local, National	MOE
SEOUL 1	Animal welfare	Local, National	City
SEOUL 2	Environmental conservation (rivers, estuaries, ocean, protected areas), Energy, Climate change, Environmental education, Environmental policy	Local, National, International	MOE
SEOUL 3	Environmental conservation (water, river, land, ocean), Energy, Climate change, Pollution, Environmental health and safety, Environmental policy	Local, National, International	MOE
SEOUL 4	Environmental education, Environmental health and safety	Local, National	MOE
SEOUL 5	Environmental conservation, Biodiversity, Environmental health and safety, Climate change, Energy, Peace relations	Local, National, International	MOE
SEOUL 6	Environmental health and safety, Environmental education, Pollution, Climate change, Environmental policy	Local, National	MOE
INTERNATIONAL 1	Environmental conservation (oceans*, forests), Climate change, Biodiversity	National, International	NA

* International 1's only agenda in Korea is on ocean-related environmental conservation.

Gap Finding

The second motivator for agenda setting is a process of finding gaps and developing them into agendas. This method can occur purposefully, or accidentally, and can overlap with method one. For example, the founder of Seoul 1 is interested only in one main agenda, animal welfare.

"The main reason I established Seoul 1 was because I wanted to make a fundamental platform, basic tools to protect animals." Under the umbrella agenda of animal welfare, Seoul 1 selects more specific topics based on the interest of activists and their members, most of whom are directly involved in industries where animal welfare is poorly regulated. Having similar concerns as the activists of Seoul 1, the activists at Regional 4 began working on ocean and animal welfare issues through the discovery of poorly regulated welfare conditions of wild animals in captivity. Both organizations owe their inception to the recognition of gaps in the perception of animal rights in Korean society.

A third example of gap finding is Seoul 4 whose founder did not intend to start an NGO, but did after finding multiple societal and governance gaps related to environmental issues. The founder of Seoul 4 set their agenda after an inspirational event, where they recognized a gap that then spurred the beginning of the organization and its environmental education agenda. The president of Seoul 4 founded their organization because they saw education as the answer to the gap between environmental knowledge and action. They first reached out to the City of Seoul with their concern, but the city did not have the capacity to invest in environmental education. Seoul 4's founder then decided to create their own environmental education for schools by developing an NGO:

> "In 2007 I attended a UN conference, and I didn't have any interest in starting an NGO… Everyone knew so much about climate change and global warming. I started to question why do people know all of this but not act? We have to move the mind to get going…For me, that was through education. I went to the Seoul Superintendent of Education and asked them to start environmental education, but

> they said there were no teachers for that, no teachers and no money... So I created a program and thought it should be used in schools. I created this NGO." (Seoul 4)

Rooted in Democratization

The third motivator is the selection of anti-pollution and anti-development agendas that stem from the pre-democratization environmental movement. These agendas are historically political but were then reimagined as quality-of-life issues, which was a concern of the moderate middle class that separated from the radical laborers after democratization. Regional 2, Seoul 2, Seoul 3, and Seoul 5 all advocate for agendas that are rooted in the democratization era; each having come into existence around this time.

The earliest founded ENGO in this study, Seoul 5, explains that their organization was founded in the early 1990s and is "one of the most important and large environmental organizations among civil society." Much of the focus of their agenda today is still anti-development. For example, they conduct advocacy related to the Four Major Rivers Project, the Seorak Mountain cable car installation, and denuclearization. Seoul 3 has similar origins as Seoul 5 and also dedicates its agenda to the same projects. The founders of Seoul 2 left Seoul 3 to develop their own organization with a different approach to advocacy, but on the same agendas. Outside of Seoul, the founder of Regional 2 began their career in the NGO sector in the mid-1990s, and now takes on an agenda that is anti-development in origins. "(Our) main point of focus is to do [river] surveys in areas planned for regional development." (Regional 2)

All four ENGOs that have origins in the democratization era have maintained their historical agendas to this day, but they have also begun using the second agenda setting method of searching for gaps. For example, Seoul 2, Seoul 3, and Seoul 5 have taken on the issue of climate change, and Regional 1 and Seoul 3 have both taken on ocean issues. The shift towards climate

change appears to be caused by a perception that Korean society, especially the younger generation, is becoming concerned by the lack of action and governance dealing with its expected impacts. The shift towards ocean issues appears to be caused by a perception that, not only are there gaps in governance, but there are also gaps in society's awareness on these issues.

Evolution out of 2000's Conservative Movement

One organization in this study has unique, political origins rooted in the conservative movement of the early 2000s. Seoul 6's origins are related to the "New Right movement," which is a now defunct conservative movement of the early 2000s. Their organization began as anti-people's (minjung) movement, but after noticing a significant decrease in membership in the early 2000s, the current president took over and transformed the organization into an environmentally focused one. Their agendas are not related to historical anti-development environmentalism; rather, they mainly focus on environmental health and safety.

Advocacy Methods

Environmental NGOs in this study advocate for their agendas either directly or indirectly. The distinction between these two methods seems to rest on whether the organization's goal is related to policy creation or not. The majority focuses their advocacy on directly attempting to influence policy making; only two organizations do not wish to be seen as attempting to influence the government.

Policy-focused

Out of the 11 ENGOs in this study, nine ENGOs share the same goal of advocating for policy change. This may be done directly or indirectly, with most organizations doing a combination of both. Direct forms of policy advocating are exemplified by ENGOs that work

within the policy making process, such as through lobbying, advising committees, and co-authoring legislation with lawmakers from the National Assembly.

The first step in the policy making process that ENGOs become involved in is the gap finding stage where ENGOs may go out into the community to find problems and then raise awareness to build public support. Seoul 1, Seoul 3, and Seoul 6 are examples of ENGOs that conduct investigations or background research, of which the results are turned into formal reports. These reports are shared with the media to increase awareness on the issues. In a small ENGO like Seoul 1, they usually collaborate with experts on each report to compare policies from other nations, usually from the US or UK, and make recommendations for policies that best fit Korea. As for Seoul 3, they have quite a large workforce, but they do use outside experts where they do not have that expertise. Reports are then shared with the media to raise public awareness and support; however, Seoul 3 also conducts protests, or "performances," that will capture the attention of the media and the public to further spread awareness (Seoul 3, activist 2). Other ENGOs, such as Regional 4, may release press releases, but not reports. Activists from Regional 4 prefer advocacy strategies such as staging protests to capture the media's and public's attention. The goal of both routes of exposing issues is to build public awareness and foster a shared sentiment that policy needs to be changed, which is often shown through petitions and asking constituents to call their representatives. Indirectly, public support is expressed through events, such as debates hosted by ENGOs where the public, NGOs, experts, and other stakeholders may be invited to participate to share their input. The ENGOs who take on these indirect tactics, include Seoul 1, Seoul 2, Seoul 3, Seoul 5, and Seoul 6, and they do so to display public support for policy change.

The second stage of the policy making process ENGOs participate in is the stage where activists interact with lawmakers at all levels of governance. Environmental NGOs in this study

often go directly to officials of cities, ministries, and the National Assembly to lobby[7] for policy changes. Activists from Seoul 1 and Seoul 3 use their reports to lobby the National Assembly members and gain legislators' support for new policies. Activists from Seoul 6 most often go to the Ministry of Environment. Those from Seoul 2 and Seoul 5 will go to the level of governance that is most pertinent to the issue at hand, from local governing level to the Prime Minister's office. Lobbying is seen to be an effective method of advocacy as activist 2 from Seoul 3 states, "In a way, it's more effective for one person to persuade a member of the National Assembly than to meet 1,000 citizens." Activists from Seoul 3 show National Assembly members reports, often tailoring the information to how the issue impacts the province or city that member represents.

There are some challenges ENGOs face when lobbying National Assembly members. Activists from Seoul 1 and Seoul 3 both recognize that, while they may have built relationships with members of a political party that are more likely to support their ENGO's agenda, they must also target members from opposition parties. Political parties change often in Korea and National Assembly members may also change after elections, so ENGOs often have to restart their lobbying work to build relationships with new members. Beyond political differences, activists find that National Assembly members often follow their constituents. This is why ENGOs participate in stage one, raising awareness and public support. Seoul 1 states that a challenge to working with any National Assembly member, setting party affiliation aside, is that they must listen to the "voters" (Seoul 1). When there is public support, National Assembly members of any party appear more likely to lend their support, based on Seoul 1 and Seoul 3's experiences. The final challenge is that ENGOs often have competition with the business sector. Seoul 1 explains that they once

[7] In the Korean case, lobbying financially is illegal, so the action does not have the financial connotations one might assume from a Western understanding. Instead, organizations have to patiently and personally convince legislators to support their bill using their reports, debates, and media outreach, among other tactics.

lobbied for nearly three years to conservative lawmakers in an eventually successful effort to counter the lobbying of Samsung, one of the largest chaebol conglomerates in Korea. To Seoul 1, the successful passing of a bill is the goal of advocating for their agenda. Despite challenges, Korean ENGO activists from this study appear to take part in lobbying often, even daily.

The third stage, serving on advisory committees, is where most ENGOs in this study participate in the policy making process. During the Lee Myung Bak presidency, advisory committees in the Blue House were dissolved, and most communication between ministries and NGOs was also closed. The ENGOs of this study share that recently, under President Moon, these communication channels have re-opened. For example, Regional 3, Regional 4; Seoul 1, Seoul 2, Seoul 3, and Seoul 5; and International 1 all mentioned having activists who served on advisory committees for governing bodies in 2019. Reginal 3 advises only the Ministry of Environment. International 1 advises only the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries. Regional 4, Seoul 1, Seoul 3, and Seoul 5 advise National Assembly committees, cities, and ministries. Seoul 2 advises all stages of governance, including the Prime Minister's office. In some instances, these ENGOs overlap advising in the same committee, such as Seoul 1 and Seoul 4 who work on animal rights committees. It appears that ENGOs are invited to serve on committees to advise policy makers in all of these cases, similar to pre-Lee presidencies.

Environmental NGOs are invited to join advisory committees because they are thought to have expert knowledge on specific agendas as well as an understanding of the public interest. After democratization, ENGOs transformed into professional organizations, often with educated activists and researchers. In the early 2000s leading up to President Lee's administration, NGO committee work was growing increasingly close to the progressive government, this closeness led

to the rising conservative movement's distrust in NGO and government relationships. Now these channels of communication have reopened and ENGOs are participating in these committees.

The fourth stage of policy making is policy writing, a practice in which Seoul 1 engages. In some cases, Seoul 1's activists will write policies and give them to National Assembly members or committees. Sometimes they are invited to collaborate on writing. Sometimes they wait to advise National Assembly members who create their own policies. During this the final stages, when legislation is voted on, Seoul 1 campaigns locally or nationally, holds public debates, publishes press releases, and lobbies National Assembly members to support the legislation. Despite their narrow agenda, financial limits, and weak public support, Seoul 1 is able to find successes in their work. For example, they previously guided the passing of a proposed law in less than one year. Seoul 1 is the only ENGO in this study to mention writing legislation as an advocacy strategy. It is important to note that while Seoul 1 does not receive government funding, which may be a sign of being politically co-opted, they give credit to National Assembly members for legislation written by their own activists and they publicly endorse lawmakers who support their legislation. This is a unique case of working with the government in this study. .

Non-policy-focused

Two ENGOs in this study do not participate in the policy making process, preferring to advocate for their agendas without impacting policy through activities such as community volunteer projects and education programs. The first of the two organizations that do not seek involvement with the government is Regional 1, the least funded ENGO in this study. The president of Regional 1 asserts that they have no impact on government or business with their advocacy, yet they still impact the environment through their volunteer river cleanups. They view their organization's advocacy as "pure volunteerism" because, "pure volunteers do not take actions

that exert pressure on the government or anyone" and their organization promotes bringing the community together to conduct voluntary cleanups (Regional 1) (Place after quote?). By showing the public the condition of the river, they can spread their message and recruit more volunteers. With more volunteer support, they are then able to continue to improve the condition of the river. To them, this "pure" form of volunteerism is separate from any government or business interests. Regional 1 has recently begun to rely on government funding to complete their projects, though it is not clear how the government benefits by choosing to do so. Perhaps the government sees value being provided to the community or river system. Nonetheless, Regional 1 is not comfortable relying on government funding. Being a small organization with a narrow agenda, if they are not able to expand their funding sources then remaining dependent on the government may put their sustainability and their ability to expand advocacy at risk.

The second ENGO that does not pursue any policy-related activities is the well-funded Seoul 4. Since their beginning, they have grown into an organization that provides to thousands of children around the country (what they claim to be) the top environmental education program in Korea. They also began conducting environmental health and safety research after being inspired to investigate the controversial and mysterious deaths that were caused by the humidifier sterilization in 2011[8]. While their research is separate from their education, they have expanded the kind of education that they offer to health and safety education as it relates to the environment. Their organization does not participate in the policy making process because they perceive that education is politically neutral. The president's opinion on participating in the policy process is that it would be a political act,

[8] https://time.com/4338272/oxy-dehumidifier-disinfectant-reckitt-benckiser-korea/

> “Environmental NGOs are very political. We are not political. Because I'm an educator. We're very neutral. There's no politics, but if you look at it this time. Mayor Park Won-soon has all the environmental NGOs. Starting with the secretary, the staff.” (Seoul 4)

Regional 1 and Seoul 4 follow narrowly focused agendas and advocacy strategies. They participate neither directly nor indirectly in policy making. To them, any encroachment into policy making would be seen as intervening in political interests; something to be avoided by “pure” ENGOs.

Regional 3’s main activities include bi-monthly beach cleanups and research on the collected plastic waste. Monthly reports on the collected waste are sent to the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries as well as abroad to an international organization that studies ocean waste around the world. Regional 3 also focuses on environmental education; they regularly hold teaching workshops and exhibitions at schools, festivals, museums, and government-sponsored events.

Most of Regional 3’s advocacy exists at the local (city/regional) level. For example, their events are held within their headquarter city and they do not share their education materials nationally. However, they do have national impact as their organization belongs to a few national ENGO networks and their president sits on an NGO advisory committee for the Ministry of the Environment, which allows them to share their opinions on policies.

Indicator 5: Service Provision

Types of Goods and Services

The ENGOs in this study provide a variety of goods and services to the public, business, and the government sectors. The services organizations provide to the public are education (including workshops and training), youth group support, cleanup activities, and volunteer opportunities. Services provided to the business sector include education (including workshops), monitoring, research, consultation (including advisory board membership). Finally, the services provided to the government by the ENGOs in this study are education (including workshops and training), event sponsorship, local campaigning, advising, research (monitoring, public surveys, environmental surveys), policy drafting, and policy discussion forums (debates, roundtables).

Services to the Public

Education Services

The most common service provided by the ENGOs of this study to the public is education, with eight organizations mentioning this service. Education comes in many forms and is served to different clientele, from elementary school children to the elderly. Environmental NGOs whose main agendas are environmental education have the widest variety of education opportunities offered, but any one of the eight ENGOs that do education do so in a variety of ways. The variations of education include classroom education (pre-elementary through university), afterschool programs, weekend programs and volunteer programs, field trips, summer camps, traveling museum exhibits, neighborhood resident workshops, safety training, educational events for the elderly, and educational booths at public events. The educational opportunities not only provide the transfer of knowledge related to the ENGOs' agenda to the public, but also provide additional services that may not be directly related to an environmental agenda. These other services include

childcare, daycare, meals, health and safety training, physical activity, volunteer opportunities, public speaking and debate practice, participatory research opportunities, and travel.

In addition to using educational services to influence the public agenda, ENGOs also engage in these services to generate funding. Seoul 4 receives half of their annual support (>1,000,000,000 won) from foundations with education-related agendas and fees from students who attend educational camps. Seoul 4 benefits financially from foundations for the educational services they provide to the public. Rather than charging the users of their services, Regional 1, Regional 3, and Seoul 6 rely on membership fees and government funding to conduct educational programs. One difference between these three organizations and Seoul 4 is that Regional 1, Regional 3, and Seoul 6 have an additional public service component to their educational projects: environmental cleanups conducted by members, volunteers from the public, and student volunteers.

Another way for generating funding from educational services is by collecting fees from camp attendees. Not all education services provided to the public are supported by foundations or government funding, such as with Regional 4, which hosts a summer camp for students, but does not apply for government funding to support the costs. Instead, Regional 4 relies on membership fees and the fees collected from their camp to sustain the majority of their budget. Like Seoul 4, Regional 4's educational services are for spreading their agenda; however, like Regional 1, Regional 3, and Seoul 6, they do conduct cleanup events occasionally. It is unclear why Regional 4 does not seek financial support from foundations or the government, but seeing that they have a positive outlook regarding membership and the member fees they collect, it is possible that Regional 4 does not see a need to expand the scope and scale of their agenda and public outreach.

Environmental Cleanups

Environmental cleanups are organized by five ENGOs in this study, and while they are done for the benefit of the natural environment, cleanup events appear to create a clean space both for people's enjoyment of nature and for public safety. Some organizations conduct beach cleanups at popular beaches and after public events. Other organizations conduct river cleanup activities both in rural and residential areas where they recognize the rivers as a part of the city's system. There are also organizations that clean up hiking trails and mountainsides to promote cleaner and safer national and city parks. Regional 1, Regional 3, and Seoul 6 focus greatly on the need for public engagement through their educational programs and offer volunteer opportunities to the public. Out of the five organizations who mentioned doing these cleanup activities, four of them are the regional organizations in this study, with Seoul 6 as the only Seoul-headquartered organizer of environmental cleanups. Limits on financial and organizational capacity may lead ENGOs into providing cleanup services. Cleanups require little in terms of preparation and tools, volunteers donate their labor, cleanups provide direct exposure to the environmental issues (educational), and they benefit the environment. For these reasons, cleanups may be a preferred public service for ENGOs working on stricter budgets.

Services to Businesses

Comparing the three sectors, ENGOs appear to be the least involved in providing goods and services to the business sector. The choice to provide services to businesses seems to be a contextual matter, differing for each organization. In some cases, organizations that are receiving funding provide services for any business partner they can, but some ENGOs are only comfortable providing services only to businesses they deem trustworthy and supportive of their agendas.

Consulting Services

Two ENGOs participate in consulting businesses, whether on business practices or by filling third party seats on advisory committees, which are Seoul 4 and Seoul 1, respectively. These two ENGOs do rely financially on foundations that are sponsored partially by businesses. Seoul 4 provides environmental safety research on products as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR) consulting for conglomerates and other business donors. They do not specify why they work with certain companies, but they appear open to providing services to the sector as businesses have become their second major group of service recipients. This may be due to the financial benefits Seoul 4 receives from providing services. A majority of their budget is direct and indirect (through conglomerate-funded foundations) business donations. If the business approves of the services Seoul 4 provides, then Seoul 4 benefits as well.

On the contrary to Seoul 4, the services ENGOs provide to businesses do not always apply to the entire businesses sector equally. Seoul 1 provides consulting only to industry members who are supportive of their agenda. The activists of Seoul 1 are open to working with companies if it is for purely nonprofit reasons, though this reduces the members of the business sector viewed as possible clients for their services:

> "I don't really work closely with private companies. If it's simply for nonprofit purpose, then I will consider, but I still don't feel comfortable to tell the public to actually consume this stuff or buy this one or use this company because you know they give us some donation." (Seoul 1)

It is expected that Seoul 1 would not trust all businesses as their major advocacy strategies include investigating businesses that violate animal welfare and lobbying against conglomerates. Undercover investigations and counter lobbying work to the detriment of businesses, and their

main target of their advocacy is the business sector. As an organization, they are carful with whom they work, but those they select invite them to provide consulting services because they recognize activists of Seoul 1 to be "third party experts" and such consulting services work towards improve Seoul 1's agenda.

Monitoring and Research Services

Environmental NGOs in this study also provide monitoring and research services to businesses. Seoul 5, which has a diverse environmental agenda does not mention consulting services, but they do provide environmental monitoring and environmental research services for businesses. This organization also relies on direct business donations for one third of their budget. The exchange of donations for services is not clear, and in Seoul 5's case, it would require additional research. Businesses are not expected to provide donations in exchange for services, however. For example, Regional 4 does not receive business donations, but they do environmental monitoring and provide research for the industry related to their agendas.

In this study, one agenda is not found to provide more services to businesses than another. In other words, ENGOs' agendas do not seem to determine whether services will be provided to businesses or not and if so, which kind. Regional 4 and Seoul 1 both share similar agendas, and while they do provide services to businesses related to their agenda, these services are different. Moreover, neither Regional 1 nor Seoul 1 receive direct financial support from businesses, unless through membership fees provided by individual members of the industry making personal choices to support the ENGOs.

Services to the Government

Organizations in this study provide goods and services to all levels of the government, especially to lawmakers and ministries. When examining the services ENGOs in this study provide

for the government, it is important to note that ENGOs that are historically tied to the progressive presidencies before 2008 (Regional 2, Seoul 2, 3, and 5) faced challenges to their service provision during Lee and Park's consecutive, conservative administrations. Under progressive leader, President Moon, the services ENGOs provide to the government serve now have at least one of three purposes: 1) to educate and advise government officials, 2) to fill in public service gaps for the government and 3) to influence policy and decision making.

Education and Advisory Services

First, ENGOs provide education to government officials through lectures, training workshops, advising, and other information-sharing meetings such as committee meetings. The purpose of education is for the transfer of knowledge on agendas from the ENGOs to government officials, especially during the problem definition and writing stages of the policy making process. These educational and advisory services are provided at all levels of governance, from rural to central governing bodies. In some cases, ENGOs host events and invite government officials, while in other cases, ENGOs are invited to host educational or training workshops for government officials or to join committees at cities and ministries. Regional 3 shares, "In [our city], there is a meeting of non-profit social organizations. When [the government] makes policies, you can ask questions and do things this way."

Some organizations in this study recognize that ENGOs must be registered to provide these services to the government, but it does not appear to be the only way. An unregistered organization, International 1 shares, "Today the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries invited us as an official advisor to a policy." This is a common occurrence for International 1, but they are not registered. Instead, their legitimacy may come not from registration nor public support, but from international pressure from their headquarters as well as leaders and citizens of other nations around the world who

support the ENGO's agenda in Korea. In the case of International 1, the international community fills the role of the Korean public in pressuring the Korean government to accept International 1's advising on creating new regulations.

As for domestic, registered Korean ENGOs, a growing bipartisan division out of the 2000s created a more difficult stage for these organizations to provide educational and advisory services. ENGOs that historically have ties to early progressive administrations appear to notice their ability to provide educational and advisory services to the government met strict backlash after the first conservative president, Lee Myung Bak, entered office in 2008. Seoul 5 recognizes that there was a change in the frequency of invitations to work on advisory committees after President Lee Myung Bak came into power, as the line of communication was broken. The activist then shares that since President Moon entered office in 2017, there has been some recovery towards reopening lines of communication:

> "As an example, right after the Lee Myung Bak administration came into power,…what you can call 'Civilian Environmental Policy Governance' that we had under Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's governments disappeared…they said they were going to break it off with environmental groups and the administration did that…As Moon Jae In's administration came in… there has been a slight tendency to recover recently."

Filing Public Service Gaps

The second purpose of why ENGOs provide services to the government is to fill in public service gaps left by the government. After democratization, Korean ENGOs began to offer public services not provided by the government. Historically, these public services were not limited only

to environmental issues, but also included welfare services, such as after the IMF Crisis in 1997[9]. Examples from interviews show that the government will invite ENGOs to provide training workshops at government offices because they do not have the capacity or expertise like the ENGO does. For example, International 1 shares, "The Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries wants a civil society organization to provide that training to the public…They don't do those sorts of things by themselves." This activist hints that without this cooperation, the workshops would not be possible for the government to offer. A second example is when the government wants to do a campaign but will not have the proper funding to at that time, they find ENGOs that can assist them. Seoul 1 experienced this when a local government did not have allocated funding for promotion and education, "Sometimes I make the promotion materials and then actually provide them for free…The government was grateful." In both cases, the government recognized their own gaps and invited ENGOs to help fill them. In other cases, ENGOs may recognize where gaps are and fill them without any government partnership, such as Seoul 4's approach to providing environmental education and Seoul 6's choice to conduct environmental safety research on everyday household products

Policy and Decision Making Services

The final service provided to the government are related to the policy making process. These services include conducting investigatory research, hosting public debates, writing the policies, and even campaigning for certain candidates during elections. None of these services mentioned appear to be limited to specific agendas, or by the financial and organizational capacity of an ENGO. All ENGOs in this study either provide or participate (such as join an event when

[9] Korean ENGOs worked with other welfare NGOs to provide services to the unemployed and homeless, who increased in numbers drastically during the IMF Crisis in 1997.

invited by other NGOs) in one of the aforementioned services. It was evident under the advocacy indicator that Korean ENGOs have interest in the policy making process, and therefore, become involved in the process at multiple stages. According to Korean ENGOs, the environmental agenda is not fully developed in Korea, and thus ENGOs find themselves having to do a lot of the groundwork to build up their agendas. By choosing to focus their advocacy on policy making and/or policy change, Korean ENGOs seem to have found themselves providing the tools Korean policy makers need to do just that. One example is Seoul 1, whose organization does the investigations, creates the reports, lobbies the policy makers, provides them with the bills, and then when a new policy is passed, they provide public support for the lawmakers who supported and cowrote the successfully passed policy. In their case, Seoul 1 was not asked to begin the investigatory work, but through doing so, they were able to raise their agenda to the National Assembly and pass laws. Other ENGOs have accomplished similar paths through conducting the groundbreaking research necessary to being to elevate issues to the government, such as Seoul 2 and Seoul 6. Other ENGOs such as Regional 3, are not as involved in the entirety of the process but do respond to the government's call when a committee of ENGOs is formed to receive feedback on new policies and decisions.

Indicator 6: Sectoral Infrastructure

Foundations

Interviewees in this study mentioned a few charitable foundations, which bring together donations from the community and businesses, where NGOs can apply for grants to work on projects relevant to the foundations' own missions. The Beautiful Foundation, or *Areumdaun Jaedan* (아름다운 재단), which was established in 1999, is one example of a foundation where ENGOs in this study apply for project grants (Regional 2, Seoul 1 and 5). This foundation is not limited to environmental projects, unlike other foundations such as the Biodiversity Foundation, or *Saengmyung Dayeongsang Jaedan* (생명다양성재단), which funds projects related to promoting biodiversity, and The Green Fund, or *Hwangyung Jaedan* (환경재단), which focuses on environmental issues in Korea and Asia. These are just three examples of foundations that combine business and public donations into funding opportunities for Korean ENGOs' projects. While foundations are not the most sought-after source of funding by the ENGOs of this study, they are sought for in some cases because they partially fund activists and experts for their labor unlike government grants, which is why some ENGOs in this study have chosen to apply for foundation grants rather than government funding (Regional 2).

ENGOs in this study who work on ocean issues mentioned that there are foundations outside of Korea that will also fund organizations with relevant projects, "There are key foundations giving grants to this kind of [civil society organizations] working on oceans issues" (International 1). The activist from International 1 shares that a variety of foundations from the US and Europe offer funding to civil society organizations that work on ocean issues. Some of the foundations that were mentioned in this study include the Packard Foundation, the Ocean's Foundation, and the Leonardo DiCaprio Foundation.

Services Provided to ENGOs

ENGOs in this study did not mention services that are provided to them by other sectors in Korea apart from educational lectures, which were mentioned by two organizations. According to Regional 1, their organization has attended lectures hosted by government ministries such as the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL). There are also programs through "lifelong learning centers," which are often operated by city offices or the Ministry of Education, but also come at a cost, "…education courses at the Seoul Lifelong Education Center for 3,000,000 won for two years…" (Seoul 1). There were no mentions of services offered to the ENGOs in this study by the business sector. Regional 1 believes that there are no business-provided services for ENGOs in Korea because, "it is difficult to do that in Korean society due to the lack of the quality or will of representatives who want to support NGOs in companies" (Regional 1). Outside of the government and business sectors, universities appear to be a place where ENGOs also look for educational services. For example, Regional 3 has attended such educational lectures hosted by a local university.

There are also education services offered by institutions on the international stage that Korean ENGOs with ocean agendas have participated in. For example, International 1 mentions that from their knowledge, an aquarium in the United State offers a training program that has trained international activists, including at least one Korean ENGO activist (not of International 1) on sustainable fisheries. There was no mention of services provided to ENGOs by the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries nor any ocean-related services provided to ENGOs, so it seems that due to the lack of in-country services, at least one ocean-focused Korean ENGO has sought services outside of Korea for further training. It does not appear that the organizations in this study take frequent advantage of government offered services, if there are more than educational services.

Moreover, it seems that some organizations seek assistance from outside of the country on agendas that are not yet on the general consciousness of the government and the public such as ocean issues. Further studies could explore the services that are offered to Korean ENGOs and the reasons behind why organizations choose to take advantage of services or not, in more depth.

Coalitions with other NGOs

Environmental NGOs in this study are active in forming coalitions with other NGOs, not limited to environmental organizations. The formation of NGO coalitions occurs from local to national levels and across agendas. Of the organizations interviewed in this study, there are three reasons why ENGOs create coalitions: to increase capacity, 2) to display support for other NGOs' agendas, 3) to increase effectiveness of advocacy.

Increasing Capacity

Environmental NGOs that recognize other organizations have resources their group lacks may develop a coalition with organizations that to fill that gap. The gaps recognized by the ENGOs in this study that have formed coalitions include knowledge, non-financial resources, financial, and public support (Regional 2, 4, International 1, Seoul 1, 2, 3, and 5). One example of an ENGO coalition that has brought together other environmental as well as non-environmental focused NGOs is the ocean-issue-related coalition that Seoul 3 and International 1 belong to:

> "We've designed a coalition project with other local NGOs because [we are] an international organization, and in Korea there's not a single organization working on oceans issues... We are looking for a local constituency, so one of our projects is to work together with the local NGOs… We have a partnership with [Seoul 3], [another large Korean ENGO] and a [large Korean Human Rights NGO]." (International 1)

Until creating the coalition, International 1 has had to rely on top-down, international pressure to advocate for their agenda in Korea. Coalitions such as this one created for ocean issues, serve to increase public support for an agenda which is not on the general consciousness of the Korean public. Seoul 3's large number of members who support the organization overall now indirectly support International 1's new, unfamiliar agenda through this coalition. International 1's agenda may begin to attract the public's attention through such a partnership, and thus the government's attention if officials and representatives are also paying attention to the public's awareness. While the coalition is small, it is meant to sustain itself organizationally at least until policy has been changed. The other NGOs participating in the coalition are also large and well-known Korean organizations with more supporting members and longer histories of policy work compared to International 1, and their human rights agendas are still in line with International 1's agenda, which also focuses on human rights in oceans issues. By expanding their agenda beyond environmental, to human rights, and by working with NGOs with substantial public support, the coalition hopes that it will raise the urgency and effectiveness of their joint agenda both in the consciousness of the public and the government.

Capacity gaps can also be addressed by even larger NGO coalitions, which exist more as city-wide, nation-wide, and even international networks. Seoul 5 describes a nation-wide coalition called the Korean Environment Conference, or *hanguk hwangyung hoe* (한국환경회), which is "a network for environmental groups from all over the county" (Seoul 5). These groups have different agendas and issues that they focus on, and through networking, Seoul 5 can call any of these organizations for assistance if they need to get training, do field work, and create joint task forces. Despite being environmentally focused, NGOs in this network are not limited to environmental agendas. With this wide range of NGO backgrounds, Seoul 5 is also able to expand capacity of

other NGOs in the network and learn from others on issues such as human rights and peace-movement organizations. Some networks have existed for years or even decades. Regional 2 mentions a national river-focused NGO network that they have been a member of since the 1990s. Some Korean ENGOs have also joined networks outside of Korea. The ENGOs in this study are comfortable forming and joining networks as a means to fill capacity gaps, expand their knowledge, and share information with the world.

Displaying Support for Other's Agendas

In some cases, ENGOs such as Seoul 3 and International 1 seek out other organizations to increase support for their agenda in terms of increasing public support. In other cases, ENGOs create and join coalitions to provide support or receive support from other NGOs. This "stronger in numbers" approach is not limited to a specific agenda or membership numbers of organizations. The coalitions serve the purpose of displaying sectoral support. They may not sustain themselves longer than one event, such as a single protest, public event, or public debate. Seoul 1 shares an example of their experience creating a temporary coalition, "I called 12 NGOs and had a joint press release…I don't continue the group work because it just takes too much time and effort and then I don't get enough outcomes" (Seoul 1). Seoul 1 is a small organization with limited financial and organizational capacity; however, Seoul 1 has successfully collected the support of 12 other NGOs to display sectoral support for their animal welfare agenda. A second example is from Regional 4, who met backlash from a city mayor when attempting to receive approval to participate in a city-organized event that they opposed. For years, conservative mayors refused to speak to activists from Regional 4. When a newly elected, progressive mayor was elected, Regional 4 was finally given approval, and they invited domestic and international NGOs operating in Korea to participate in the event to show a large display of support for their agenda to the city, both the

government and residents. The activist from Regional 4 shares that this is a tactic they use often at protests across the country and is not limited to environmental agendas as they also participate in peace protests with peace-NGOs. Using this "stronger in numbers" method to display support illustrates NGOs' resilience to challenges of their capacity and political challenges to their agenda.

Increasing Effectiveness of Advocacy

A third reason for why NGOs create coalitions, which also overlaps with reasons one and two, is that ENGOs work together on similar issues to increase the effectiveness of the outcomes of their advocacy. Seoul 3's and International 1's coalition is an example of this purpose, where the goal of their collective advocacy is to pass laws. A second example comes from Seoul 1, who shares that they work with other ENGOs, such as Seoul 3, on green election campaigns, which are the campaigns where ENGOs create lists of "green" candidates of different parties that they support. They share that, "We had the campaign for the green election. I've been working with them for a long time." Arguably one of the original coalitions created by ENGOs in Korea, the green election campaign serves the purpose of placing political candidates, such as National Assembly members, who support environmental agendas into office, which then increases the changes of political support of agendas and policy change.

Partnerships with Businesses

Partnerships between ENGOs and the business sector were uncommon in this study. On this, to reiterate Regional 1's statement, Korean businesses do not appear to connect directly with ENGOs. One example of ENGO-business partnerships is provided by Seoul 5, who shares that their organization partners with businesses, but their activists are split on this choice, "This is a very controversial point...At least there should be trust that the company doesn't use us as a tool for greenwashing" (Seoul 5). Their partners are often environmentally focused, charitable brands

from both Korea and abroad. These companies have positive reputations in Korea, and because of this, there is less controversy partnering with them. Seoul 1 also shares reservations for accepting business partnerships, feeling that they would be facing a moral dilemma if they accepted money to promote a business's product to their supporters. While business partnerships may be controversial in that ENGOs have to be careful of being used and face a dilemma of accepting money to push a product, some organizations are more open to the idea of partnering with businesses.

When considering accepting business partnerships, Regional 3 approaches the idea from the business's public relations and investment perspectives. They wonder if a business would want to invest resources into a small organization such as their own, compared to working with much larger ENGOs with a larger base of supporters. Regional 3 is looking to expand their financial sources beyond membership and government project funding, and thus is considering approaching businesses for partnerships. They are hopeful that they may one day be able to secure such partnerships. The potential success of Regional 3's wish is demonstrated by Seoul 4's own growth that they attribute to partnerships with businesses, "One of our partners is the biggest [conglomerate]. Their main CSR is us right now. That's how we grew." According to Seoul 4, achieving such a successful partnership in Korea is not easy because, "companies are not interested at all." Seoul 4's president believes that compared to American companies, which are more open to sustainable development and corporate social responsibility, it takes a lot of effort to get through to Korean companies such as the conglomerate they partner with, "You have to continue with it once you get it. You should not quit after one try. They have different standards." After completing a year worth of consulting with the conglomerate, Seoul 4 has expanded their partnerships with businesses to other large firms in Korea. Seoul 4 is unique in this study in terms of continuing

successful, long-term business partnerships, but they also acknowledge the challenges in Korea that NGOs face when attempting to work with businesses.

Partnerships with Government

Korean ENGOs in this study show examples of partnerships cultivated between themselves and different levels of the government. Similar to how registered organizations in Korea are able to receive invitations to provide services for the government, these organizations are also able to be invited to partner with the government. Government partnerships take many forms, including co-hosting events, running campaigns together, collaborating in information sharing and decision-making committees, and even co-authoring policies. The reasons why ENGOs take part in these activities with the government mirrors the reasons why they provide services to the government: 1) to spread their agenda, and 2) to influence environmental policies.

Spreading Agendas

The first reason why ENGOs in this study take part in partnerships with the government is to spread their agenda both within the public and the government. One example of a partnership that accomplishes these goals is provided by Regional 2. They worked on public-interest projects that have been sponsored by the Ministry of the Environment. The example they provide is of a public event that includes cultural forums, contests, and a tour of a river where nearly 1,000 people and 150 organizations from across Korea gather. Regional 2 (along with other environmental groups) organizes the event, essentially structuring it as they wish and the government provides the funding, "national money" (Regional 2). The Ministry does not appear to be a hands-on partner, but rather it allows the organizations to run the entire event with the public.

Not all ENGO-Government partnerships mirror Regional 2's experience. Some organizations that look to spread their agendas do so by joining round tables or committees with

government officials. Regional 4 experienced this when they began to advocate in Seoul and caught the attention of the late Seoul Mayor Park Won-soon, whose background was vital in bringing animal rights into the public spotlight with the push from Regional 4's advocacy. A committee was created in Seoul to discuss the future of specific animal welfare cases that caught the public attention, and Regional 4's agenda has since gained widespread support from the Korean public and progressive politicians. Other ENGOs in this study participate in regular and irregular discussion tables with government officials, but Regional 4's case best showcases the change in public awareness that can occur when both politicians and ENGOs' agendas align.

Influence Policy

A second reason why ENGOs in this study partner with the government is to influence the policy process. The ability to partner with the right officials in the government appears to be a contributor to the success of these partnerships. In the case of Regional 4, not only was their agenda spread in the public, but policies were changed in support of their agenda due to their recognition and work with the late Mayor of Seoul. Another area of the government where ENGOs direct their efforts towards policy-focused partnerships is the National Assembly. Seoul 5's activist shares that they aim to partner with National Assembly members, stating, "In order to pass legislation, you need National Assembly members because they are very important partners" (Seoul 5). Their activists participate in committees where they meet lawmakers to have discussions on laws and share their research "almost on a daily basis" (Seoul 5). Their constant, close interaction with National Assembly members has led Seoul 5 to value National Assembly members as partners helping them achieve their goal, which is to pass environmental legislation. While their advocacy approaches may differ, Seoul 1, 2, and 3 follow similar patterns of partnerships with National Assembly members. Seoul 1, who also values working closely with National Assembly members

on policy writing, shares that their experiences depend on which lawmakers they work with and if those lawmakers change after elections, “Sometimes the [National Assembly] members who are interested in this issue won’t get elected and then I have to start from the beginning” (Seoul 1). Activists may have their go-to National Assembly members, but they appear to build new relationships as often as with every election.

In Korea, the National Assembly is not the only lawmaking body in Korea, as ministries also create policies and enforce them. Korean ENGOs appear to understand that they must work on building partnerships with Ministries as well, if they wish to pass policy. According to Seoul 1, not only are National Assembly members partners when it comes to legislation but so is the Ministry of Environment (MOE). The MOE also plays an active role in supporting Seoul 1’s animal welfare agenda, “The Ministry of Environment is really cooperative” (Seoul 1). Seoul 1 is not registered to the Ministry of Environment, but they have a cooperative relationship with them. This cooperative nature is not a characteristic of all ministries, however. For example, activist 1 from Seoul 3 says that their organization also believes the Ministry of Environment is a partner who is open to conversation, but as for the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries (MOF), “We cannot think of them as partners yet, but we are starting talks slowly…the MOF is not yet used to conservations with NGOs” (Seoul 3, activist 1). While Seoul 3 is attempting to open lines of communication with the MOF, they are finding it difficult because the process has not been as easy as it is communicating with the MOE. These examples reveal that while registration allows ENGOs the privilege of being invited to have a seat at the table, the table at which they sit may decide the fate of their advocacy. Furthermore, possible reasons why the two ministries have opposing images to Korean ENGOs as partners in policy making are explored under the final indicator, public perception.

Partnership with IOs

Out of the ENGOs in this study, there are a few cases where partnerships with international organizations are pursued. Regional 3 is one example as they have partnered with a regional organization that monitors ocean waste. Regional 3 sends data as a representative of Korea to this organization who then is able to share information with an organization based in the US who publishes world reports. The regional organization also provides a hub for ENGOs such as Regional 3 to share knowledge and training on ocean-related issues. A second example of an ENGO in this study who partners with organizations outside of Korea is Seoul 4. They partner annually with the United Nations (UN) to co-host educational programs in Korea. These programs teach students to address environmental issues such as climate change and provide them with an experience similar to a UN Conference of the Parties. A third example is Seoul 2, who is careful to acquire expert opinion to inform how they address their agendas. According to their vice president, in cases where the necessary information cannot be acquired at the local and national levels, their activists will reach out to international organizations,

> "We're going to do our activities related to our agenda. I think it's just about that level right now…Maybe it's not even a local resident nor an expert. That's why we are forming a network with international organizations and international/overseas organizations. If we need that network to do certain things, then we go that way." (Seoul 2)

In the case of Seoul 2, they collaborate at the international level through international treaties such as the Ramsar Convention of Wetlands as a representative of Korea through the Ramsar Convention Secretariat. Their research in Korea is a now a part of the Ramsar protected wetlands network of nations from all around the world. Since their formalization after democratization,

Korean ENGOs have been in the international spotlight, and it appears that despite agendas and capacities, Korean ENGOs do not appear to shy away from opportunities to work internationally to this day.

Partnership with Media

The final partnerships to explore within the Sectoral Infrastructure Indicator are with the media. ENGOs in this study work with the media to spread their agenda and information regarding their advocacy. The ways in which they partner with media is through press releases and reaching out for comments. Some ENGOs assist the press more closely than others. Additionally, Regional 3, and Seoul 2, Seoul 3, Seoul 4, and Seoul 5 share that they have working relationships with the media, but Regional 1 and Seoul 6 do not have relationships or partnerships with the media.

Seoul 1 is an example of a close partnership. Seoul 1's relationship with the media changed as their agenda became more popular with the general public, occurring after reports on animal welfare conditions captured the public's attention:

> "Ten years ago, I usually had to find a reporter who was interested, who had personal interest in animals. There was probably one in every media. Like one person. But now if I just send out the press release, it will be covered by most. I don't even have a personal relationship with them." (Seoul 1)

As the public interest in their agenda grew, more reporters picked up animal welfare stories. As a result, their president saw a shift in more media wanting to cover their agenda and using Seoul 1 as a source, which their activists are happy to do. While working with media has become easier, at the same time, Seoul 1's president feels that their relationship with the press is much less personal than it used to be when only a few reporters covered animal welfare issues.

Indicator 7: Public Image

Media Sector

Perception on Relationships with the Media

As mentioned under indicator 6, sectoral infrastructure, some ENGOs in this study work with the media regularly while some do not work with the media at all. An activist's perception of their organization's and the ENGO sector's relationship with the media is complicated and varies by organization. This variation ranges from Seoul 1's positive experience, "I have very good relationship with the media," to Regional 1's negatively received perception, "The mass media is also negative about the group's activities." The difference in perception by the media is explained well by Seoul 2 who shares that, "In general, the relationship between the media and the civil society is symbiotic and sometimes competitive" (Seoul 2). Symbiotic relationships often come in the form of partnerships, where an ENGO may send out press releases for the media to report on and, in return, the media can reach out to ENGOs for comments and advising on their own investigations (Regional 4, Seoul 1 and Seoul 5).

Relationships with the media evolve as the media's perception of ENGOs and their agendas change. For example, Seoul 1 recognizes that their agenda was not as popular a decade ago and therefore not many reporters were interested in covering their issues. During those times, they were close to a few members of the media who covered their issues. Over time, with the growing popularity of companion animals, animal welfare issues also grew on the national agenda. The media gained interest in covering related issues, and Seoul 1 now recognizes that it has become easier to share information with a wider range of media outlets. However, due to the expanse of media coverage today, their relationships with reporters have become less personal than before.

Along with the shift away from close personal ties to the media, ENGOs also documented a change in how information has been spread. Seoul 2 explains that up through President Roh's regime, ENGOs had to work with the media to disseminate information on their agendas. Over time, there has been a shift in how the public and NGOs have been able to spread information and an increase in the amount of available information,

> "Everyone has access to more information. You can make arguments based on more information and communicate your voice through more channels. The media was the only role in the past. Now it can be the people who can make their own voices and become the media." (Seoul 2)

This change created the competitive nature between ENGOs and the media. Depending on certain agendas, media outlets still work with NGOs, but they may also ignore or refute the opinions of environmental organizations. International 1 explains that because ocean issues are perceived as international (and not local) issues, and are, therefore, not important to the Korean public, their organization can only work with a few individual journalists. The journalists who write on ocean issues do so with the same purpose as International 1's advocacy, to target the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries, but not the public. International 1 believes that the media they work with knows that, "We are the only NGO who is specialized in [this ocean issue] who also has very extended international input, and Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries listens to that" (International 1). In a way, ocean issues are now mirroring the animal welfare agenda's experience from a decade before when the public had no interest and only a few reporters wanted to cover animal welfare. If ocean issues can attract the public's interest, then perhaps the media will be willing to assist ocean-focused ENGOs in getting their stories out to the public and begin building support for this relatively new agenda in Korea.

Business Sector

Relationships between the business sector and Korean ENGOs in this study are approached with caution mixed with either doubt or optimism. As mentioned under indicator 6, sectoral infrastructure, the ENGOs in this study, who partner with businesses, benefit financially and are organizationally stable, but these organizations are also cautious of business's intentions. Seoul 5 shares that trust is important when building relationships with the business sector as some businesses will use ENGOs in a way that greenwashes the company's image, or makes their company appear environmentally aware, but does not truly value the environment beyond its profitability. Seoul 2 and Seoul 5 are also aware that there are specific agendas that businesses may be more likely to support, and thus are mindful of this when they build relationships.

Doubting Success of Business Relationships

Regional 1 is an example of an ENGO that opposes business relationships. They believe that business relationships are "difficult" because companies do not perceive ENGOs as partners worthy of their support and resources, "It can be said that it is difficult to [partner with businesses] in Korean society due to the lack of the quality or will of representatives who want to support NGOs in companies" (Regional 1). Regional 1 strives to not interfere in business interests, but they recognize that this "difficult" relationship does not mean that businesses may still have some social contribution projects they pursue on their own. It is unclear from this study what businesses' social contributions look like, but one way may be the donations made to foundations that then make decisions on how to distribute such funds to support ENGO projects.

Cooperation Transforming Perception of Businesses

Environmental NGO's perception of business relationships is able to change if ENGOs find that their advocacy depends on positive business relationships. Some ENGOs have learned

that they were able to transform their relationship with businesses who once saw their organization as "enemies" (Regional 4). In Regional 4's case, this change occurred when their advocacy strategy successfully improved the welfare of animals and was financially beneficial to the industries that collaborated in the work. In other cases, ENGOs run into difficulty, as mentioned by Regional 1, but continue to work on transforming their relationships with businesses because their agendas depend on it. The activist from International 1 shares:

> "Even if the international shame is gone, there is still a confusion among the government and industry…So the last [few years have] always been a back and forth of confrontations, negotiations, sometimes personal issues, sometimes blaming them. We sort of adopted various strategy to make sure they continue their reforms." (International 1)

As with their relationships to the media, ENGOs like International 1 have agendas that are not well received by the business sector, yet their success in advocating for their agenda depends on cooperation with businesses. The challenges International 1 has faced, which has led to attempting various strategies to cooperate with businesses, may be due to their advocacy targeting economically successful industries, which is shown by Regional 4 to be a motivating factor for businesses to work with ENGOs. Without economic motivation, these industries will not be open to collaboration with ENGOs. Seoul 3, a member of the coalition with International 1 shares, "Right now there is economic profit coming from the ocean but looking at the results of our national ocean development areas on fishers, that is very light" (Seoul 3, activist 1). The ocean agenda of Seoul 3 and International 1 does not appeal to businesses because there is both profit and little interference of governmental development within the industry. While profit may not be

the sole driving force for Korean businesses, environmental organizations working on ocean issues are frustrated that they are not able to build relationships with the necessary industries.

Win-Win Relationships with Businesses

Some ENGOs in this study have found success in creating lasting relationships with businesses. Seoul 4 has found a way to build business relationships in a manner which they describe as "win-win" (Seoul 4). By consulting large businesses on corporate social responsibility, Seoul 4 has been able to secure the support of large Korean conglomerates. Their relationship with the business sector is positive and both the ENGO and their business partners perceive benefits that derive from their collaboration. For the ENGO, Seoul 4, they have been able to maintain their focus on environmental education and expand their advocacy because of this business support. For the businesses, they have received consulting to improve their image and donate to a well-known educational ENGO. Seoul 4 believes that the benefits keep the businesses supportive partners to their organization, and if these benefits disappear, so might the businesses' support. Even businesses that work well with ENGOs, such as in Seoul 4's case, do not appear to have altruistic reasons for their support. Only if an ENGO is able to provide valuable benefits, do businesses maintain connections with ENGOs.

Like Seoul 4, Regional 3 also focuses on environmental education, and sees potential for a win-win relationship with businesses. The president of Regional 3 wishes to build strong relationships with businesses because they perceive business support as both a step away from the restrictions of government funding and a stable form of financial support. The president also understands that businesses in Korea are hard to work with because they are often attracted to ENGOs that are already established, well-known, and provide businesses with services that are "worth investing in" (Regional 3). Because their ENGO must appear to be a worthwhile investment

to businesses, Regional 3 is working towards building their image as an active and successful organization. They perceive their own organization's expansion and autonomy from the government depends on their acquiring financial benefits through collaborative and sponsoring relationships with businesses.

Government Sector

The Korean government has worked with ENGOs since the Democratization movement in 1987. Over time, their relationship grew closer as activists and leaders joined advisory committees at all levels of governance. A downturn in this closeness is thought to have occurred in the 2000s around the time of President Lee Myung Bak's election. The ENGOs interviewed in this study offer insight that adds to the story of how the relationship between the government and environmental organizations has since evolved.

Presidential Regimes

Following two decades of increasingly closer relationships with progressive civilian-elected administrations after democratization in 1987, the ENGOs interviewed in this study identify a turning point in their relationship with the government beginning with the 2008 election of Lee Myung Bak. During President Lee's administration, ENGOs faced unprecedented challenges, such as having their central government funding pool diminished by 50%, communication through NGO advisory committees cut off, and a politicization of environmental issues due to government-supported development projects such as the Four Major River Project. The election of President Park ensured a second conservative administration would not reverse trends set in motion by Lee. In 2017, progressives regained power, and ENGOs are now, for the first time, returning to a familiar political atmosphere. In the following section ENGOs share their

perceptions of times spent under the administrations of President Lee Myung Bak (2008-2013), President Park Geun Hye (2013-2017), and President Moon Jae In (2017- time of study).

Opposition and Division from Conservative Governments

The ENGOs in this study who have their roots in the Democratization movement found the Lee and consecutive Park administrations difficult. Both conservative presidents challenged the environmental agendas of such groups by favoring businesses and development projects over conservation and anti-nuclear energy actions. Out of the ENGOs in this study that have witnessed a shift in the government's attitude towards ENGOs since the democratization era, Seoul 5 best describes the change:

> "If you want to say there was a change in influence, at least during Lee Myung Bak or Park Geun Hye, there was an unconditional combative attitude. Because there were incidents like the Four Major River Project and the Seorak Mountain cable car, no denuclearization, and they were continuously giving out licenses for new coal-fired power plants...There were a lot of things going on that were more favorable for corporations. So almost all of the situations were controversial, and a combative atmosphere was formed." (Seoul 5)

Seoul 5 describes the Lee and Park administrations as unconditionally "competitive" towards the environmental agenda. Under Lee, round tables and NGO advisory committees were dissolved and communication with NGOs was cut off, which continued under Park. This combative attitude is the opposite of what NGOs faced with the progressive presidencies until 2008; however, scholars Ju and Tang do show that this attitude was growing prior to Lee's presidency as Roh's administration faced backlash from National Assembly members who wished to reduce the impact NGOs were having on Roh's office (2011). With the rise in rights movements, such as the Far

Right movement in the early 2000s, the public began to divide into progressive and conservative political ideologies. Progressives believed in friendly relations with North Korea, accepted support from other nations such as the US, and sought for welfare improvements that were not addressed during Park and Chun's authoritarian regimes. The growing opposition to the progressive's ideology believed in a harder stance against North Korea and gave credit to President Park Chung Hee for his leadership and development of Korea. This split in ideology became evident after the elections leading into the Roh administration when conservative National Assembly members were elected. After President Roh, Presidents Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye served as consecutive, conservative leaders. Lee and Park's conservative ideology led them to implement development projects that the progressives found reminiscent of the pre-democratization era. The conservative ideology reflected the growing conservative sentiment that longed for a return to the path rapid of industrialization era under Park Chung Hee.

While supporters of Lee and Park would argue that their projects, such as the Four Major Rivers Project (Lee) and the Seorak Mountain cable car (Park) had environmentally beneficial intentions, ENGOs who fought against these projects tell a different story. Seoul 3 believes that President Lee used the platform from his successful project deconstructing the Seoul highway and restoring the Cheonggyecheon River (청계천) while he was the Mayor of Seoul to justify the Four Major Rivers Project. While the Cheonggyecheon River restoration gained some credibility as a pro-environment project at the time, the Four Major Rivers Project did not serve any environmental agenda; rather, this mega project served to enlarge Lee's image of successful large-scale development, invoking Park Chung Hee. According to Seoul 3, the Four Major Rivers Project led to the turning point when all environmental issues became politicized,

> "It was a little bit politically progressive…This is because being against the Four Major Rivers Project itself is being against the government administration. It was this project when every problem in our country became political." (Seoul 3, administrator)

Because of the cutoff of direct communication to the Blue House, Korean ENGOs were frustrated that they were not able to influence the decision to carry out the projects that the Lee and Park administrations established. To this day, ENGOs like Seoul 2, Seoul 3, and Seoul 5 continue to research the impacts of these projects and advocate against them. The Lee and Park administrations complicated the relationships between ENGOs and the Korean government that previous presidents had built. Seoul 2's vice president's statement best summarizes this change and its impact on ENGOs as:

> "Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Roh Moo Hyun's governments made systems and laws for the invigoration of NGOs and civil society. But under Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye, things took a strange turn." (Seoul 2)

Other ENGOs in the study without close ties to the democratization era share a similar view that these two conservative leaders changed the government's relationship with the ENGO sector. Regional 4 shares the impacts on the NGO sector and society that stemmed from Lee's efforts reduce the NGO sector have been negative and lasting. They recount the crackdowns on peaceful candlelight vigils during Lee's second year as president:

> "Lee Myung Bak decided on a brutal crackdown of social movements after this conservative movement realized that the social movement became strong, so after this whole year of candlelight vigil, they sent the police unit. Protestors and people were killed." (Regional 4)

Regional 4 associates the Lee presidency not only with blocking social movements, but also with violence and the death of peaceful Korean citizens. The activist from Regional 4 views President Lee's crackdowns as harmful to the public, but they also believe that whether a government is "democratic or conservative, right-wing…It was not good for the people" (Regional 4). While Regional 4 is an environmental organization, they also advocate for peace movements and, therefore, find it challenging to support governments engaging in military activities, such as the Korean government whose military remains active to this day.

The president of Regional 1 shares that Lee and Park both made changes to national laws such as the NGO Registration Law and the Law on Voluntary Service, which govern registered organizations and regulations surrounding volunteering, respectively. The president of Regional 1, who cares about the integrity of pure volunteerism, shares on the lasting impacts of Park's changes to volunteerism in Korea:

> "I think that the volunteer system has been reduced to political use by using the military volunteer center, making it difficult to restore it now. It is funny to say that the government and local governments are cutting off pure volunteer work, but it is difficult without changing the system that makes it obedient." (Regional 1)

Volunteering in Korea is already lacking in public support, and President Park's politicization of volunteerism has resulted in the public's and NGO's doubt in the integrity of a volunteer culture in Korea. With the lack of volunteers who do so for the sake of volunteering, Korean NGOs face a challenge to their autonomy. Without volunteers, they may not be able to continue projects or current ways of spreading their agenda to the public. This top-down policy change from Park is an example of how the president's actions have implications at the grassroots level of Korean society, impacting the integrity of volunteering and the autonomy of ENGOs.

Reinvigoration of Government: NGO Relations

Presidents Lee and Park were conservative leaders, and mirroring Park's father, Park Chung Hee, were supportive of business and rapid development. After playing a large role in Park Geun Hye's impeachment, progressive leader President Moon Jae In was elected to office in 2017. While Park's regime was an extension of Lee's, Moon chose to reopen communication channels with ENGOs, but has done so cautiously. While the exact reasons for this caution are not clear, Seoul 2, Seoul 3, and Seoul 5 acknowledge that Moon's administration has also been slow to make any major environmental decisions up to the time of the interviews (summer 2019). Seoul 5 recognized, "In MJI's administration, there isn't anything like a fight, but they are waiting on several agenda items jointly, … So it seems that civilian governance is coming back" (Seoul 5). Perhaps it is reasonable that Moon is not acting too quickly. Having taken office upon the impeachment of Park, he governs in a time that illuminated many issues of corruption within the highest levels of the Korean government and even created suspicion towards the entire nonprofit sector after Park's confidant, Choi Soon Sil was alleged of setting up false charities. Despite these setbacks, ENGOs like Seoul 5 have found hope for the future of civilian governance and civil society's voice in Korea.

Ministries

All ENGOs in this study are affiliated with or work with Ministries in Korea to some extent. Ministries, such as the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries (MOF) focus on environmental issues and thus their relationship to ENGOs is pertinent to this study. According to Seoul 2, MOE and MOF followed President Lee's orders to close off communication with the NGO sector. Now, under President Moon, as communication has opened, the relationship NGOs now have with some ministries is one of "considerably faithful convergence"

(Seoul 2). Under Moon, the MOE and MOF are more open to collaborating with ENGOs than they were previously. The idea of a "faithful convergence" shows that Seoul 2 perceives that the government has regained trust in ENGOs, which it had lost during the decade prior to Moon's administration under Lee and Park.

There may have been top-down pressure on ministries to close communication with NGOs; however, the activist of International 1 believes that the president does not have a lot of influence on how open ministries are to working with ENGOs as:

> "The factor that really determines the relationship between NGOs and the government is the bureaucrats. They do not change. They have their own specific cultures. But when there is more exposure of the NGOs to those bureaucrats then they are more comfortable…But if it is sort of an isolated area that they are governing then they are very defensive, they do not talk, and they do not engage." (International 1)

It is not known to what extent ministries lose (or gain) trust in ENGOs, but some balance likely exists between considerations of the ruling political ideology and the experiences ministry bureaucrats have had with ENGOs.

Overall, the ENGOs in this study believe that the MOE has a positive perception of their organizations and thus have a positive working relationship. Environmental NGOs feel that the MOE is open to communication and is friendly in their approach to collaboration. Seoul 1 shares that in their experience, "The Ministry of Environment is really cooperative" (Seoul 1). This may be because the leading bureaucrats within the MOE have longstanding relationships with ENGOs:

> "Because Minister Cho Myung-rae has origins in environmental organizations, it seems that generally, the awareness of those kinds of NGOs and how they have

changed together. But we have been fighting all the time for the last 10 years." (Seoul 5)

The current minister of the MOE, who was appointed by President Moon, is a former ENGO president. With Cho's experience, ENGOs seem to be able to communicate openly with MOE, which was not the case during Lee and Park, according to Seoul 5. Perhaps Lee and Park appointed officials who were not close to ENGOs due their mistrust for the sector, but that remains unclear in the literature today. It is clear that after Moon appointed Cho as Minster of the Environment, ENGOs experienced a change in the perception of the MOE. Seoul 2, who has collaborated with the MOE since their recent registration shares that, from what they have witnessed, "The [MOE] recognizes the importance and the need to collect opinions from NGOs compared to the past."

One ENGO in this study, by contrast, has had a very different experience with MOE. Seoul 6, formerly a right-wing political movement turned environmental organization, believes that there is too much influence of "militant" environmental organizations on the MOE. They blame this for making cooperation on research and policies between Seoul 6 and MOE challenging. Additionally, Seoul 6 has not had positive experiences with the media whom they claim favors the MOE. The president feels that their organization is being used by the MOE as a tool for media play. Because the positive perception of the MOE is not unanimous, further research could expand on why ENGOs such as Seoul 6 face backlash from the MOE and the media while other organizations perceive the MOE as cooperative.

In contrast to the majority of experiences with the MOE, the ENGOs in this study who communicate and work with the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries (MOF) tell a different story. According to Seoul 1, regarding their animal welfare agenda, the MOF is not supportive because their agenda impacts industries that the MOF manages, and thus, the MOF is not cooperative.

However, Seoul 1's president does not see this as a fixed trait of the MOF, stating, "if they change their opinion, we can be friends again. Its only temporary that we are not friends" (Seoul 1). The issues in question involved strong industry influence on the MOF's side while the MOE who was also involved favored regulations that Seoul 1 suggested. Cooperation was difficult, yet it may only be difficult on a case-by-case basis. Seoul 3 and International 1 seem to have similar experiences to Seoul 1 in that the MOF has been more focused on industry interests over environmental issues. Moreover, both Seoul 3 and International 1 claim that the MOF is less experienced communicating with ENGOs. Seoul 3's activist remarks:

> "We cannot think of [MOF] as partners yet, but we are starting talks slowly with the central government. The MOF is not yet used to conservations with NGOs. In Korea, there isn't much ocean activism…Like conversations NGOs have with the Ministry of the Environment, the MOF is not yet comfortable." (Seoul 3, activist 1)

Unlike the decades of experience that the MOE has working with ENGOs and cultivating relationships among bureaucrats and activists, the MOF has not yet had that experience. The MOF is still very industry focused, with Seoul 3's activist estimating that the MOF dedicates about 10% of its focus on environment compared to 90% on port and industry (Seoul 3, activist 1). International 1 also recognizes the MOF's lack of experience working with ENGOs calling the ministry, "an all-boys playground" (International 1). The activist says this because NGOs registered to MOF appear to be created by ex-industry people looking to continue to influence the MOF. While no ENGOs registered to the MOF were responsive to requests to interview in this study, one ENGO interviewed does have a positive relationship with the MOF.

As of the interview, Regional 3 was contemplating registering with the MOF because of their positive relationship. On the topic of marine debris cleanup, the MOF is active in

collaborating with Regional 3 on projects and volunteer cleanup efforts on a monthly basis. Regional 3's organization fills in gaps that the MOF needs addressed, such as educating fishers on marine waste reduction, collecting data on beach pollution, and cleaning up the beach environment. Compared to other ENGOs in this study who try to work with the MOF, Regional 3 appears to be the only ENGOs with a "win-win" relationship with the MOF whereas the other organizations are attempting to increase regulations on industries that the MOF manages. In the case of the MOF, while more research is needed, it is emerging that because their ministry has less of an environmental focus, they are more likely to be collaborative with ENGOs who do not interfere with industry and instead focus on filling capacity gaps that overlap the "10%" of the ministry that focuses on the environment. Additionally, with their research efforts, Regional 3 was able to assist the MOF in receiving billions of won in funding. While environmental ocean issues are not yet big on the public's or central government's agenda, Regional 3 has managed to secure successful collaboration with the MOF addressing environmental ocean issues. Regional 3 not only receives recognition for their work on ocean issues by the MOF, but also by other ENGOs such as Regional 2 who believes that Regional 3's education work is improving the public's awareness of microplastics in the ocean and their effect on human health. As Regional 3 is the only case in this study with an active, positive relationship with the MOF, further study is recommended that should explore the drivers of the MOF to collaborate with ENGOs.

Building Relationships with the National Assembly

Prior to Lee Myung Bak's administration, ENGOs were already monitoring National Assembly committees and working with National Assembly members on policy development. When the Lee administration cut off direct ties between the Blue House, executive branch (including ministries) and ENGOs, there was actually an increase in the work ENGOs did

advocating to National Assembly committees and individual members. Seoul 2 shares that from their experience:

> "Under Lee Myung Bak's government and Park Geun Hye's government, when [the process of communication] wasn't securely open, going through the National Assembly, you could be given a seat in the center of the National Assembly. So sometimes they were called out by force to debate." (Seoul 2)

Seoul 2 explains that instead of going to the Blue House, ENGOs went to the National Assembly and essentially secured their own seat at the table through their own insistence. In doing this, they were then able to directly communicate with National Assembly members through debates, and they evolved ways to continue to participate in the policy making process.

Environmental NGOs in this study have continued to view National Assembly members as partners into the Moon administration. Nowadays there appears to be plenty of opportunity for direct communication between National Assembly members and ENGOs. In some cases, ENGOs in this study lobby National Assembly members while others participate in regular advisory committees with National Assembly members. According to Seoul 1, this relationship is not always positive and to some extent the positivity of their relationship with certain lawmakers depends on their political ideology, while in other cases it may depend on how convincing the evidence that they lobby with is:

> "With the National Assembly member who I was working with closely, we drafted the piece of legislation. Some members of the National Assembly laugh in my face [and say], 'Why are you doing it? Laws for animals? Are there even laws for newborns?'…But now in the past four or five months, we have five different

> proposals at the National Assembly that are waiting to be reviewed and waiting to be discussed." (Seoul 1)

Seoul 1 is aware that their agenda is not favored by all lawmakers in the National Assembly, but their activists persist with their lobbying and policy writing, nonetheless. And while there are some members who they work with closely, Seoul 1 is aware that National Assembly members are representatives who answer to their constituents. National Assembly members will follow the sentiment of their constituents first, even when working with organizations such as Seoul 1. Seoul 3, another ENGO that lobbies the National Assembly, is also aware of how National Assembly members rely on the public's support to make decisions. They use data and statements by constituents from a policy makers' regional area to convince National Assembly members to follow their policy suggestions. Because National Assembly members are elected officials, if they are not elected again, ENGOs that had worked in the National Assembly to direct policy discussions have to start over lobbying and convincing new members to support their agendas.

The General Public

This section focuses on the perception ENGOs feel that the public has of environmental activism in Korea. There have been shifts in the public's trust in ENGOs as well as the support of environmental agendas in Korea. These shifts appear to happen between presidencies, with a decrease in trust in the 2000s then a rise again in the mid-2010s. As for public support of environmental agendas, there appears to be a generational gap between the democratization generation and those who are currently in their 20s and 30s who are not interested or invested in the environmental agendas of the "past." Furthermore, there appear to be new environmental agendas that have no public awareness, yet ENGOs hope to build support among the public.

Shifts in Public Trust

The first major takeaway from the interviews is that there has been a shift in how ENGOs function and this has created a change in the public's trust of ENGOs compared to the decade immediately following democratization. Seoul 2's vice president shares that during the 1990's there was an expansion of the NGO sector, and ENGOs such as KFEM came to represent citizen's voices (Seoul 2). The NGOs that formed in the 2000s, such as Seoul 2, do not consider the general public to be a part of their support base:

> "Groups like us that formed in the mid-2000s have different bases. If you ask me now, if our organization's base is the ordinary citizen, I would say that I don't think so. We're now sort of an expert, local government, and then activists in other activist groups. If not that, we are a unit of policy decision making in the central government…Some organizations are focused only on members of the National Assembly, or some are specialized in administration in central government, or some are based in local spaces." (Seoul 2)

Between the 1990s and the 2000s, there was a shift from ENGOs representing the voice of the people to ENGOs forming as expert groups focusing on certain issues and working closely with different levels of government. Seoul 2 sees their own organization as the later type of ENGO and is aware that they do not attract the attention of "ordinary citizens." Seoul 2 does not believe that its main base is the public, and they are aware of their relationship to the central government.

Supporting Seoul 2's perception, the president of Regional 1 shares that ENGOs were respected in the 1990s, but due to the shift towards working as political interveners and the politicization of volunteerism, the public's perception shifted negatively:

> "It's changed a lot. In the '90s, NGOs were respected, but now they are seen as an intervention groups, and volunteer work itself is shameful because it is judged that volunteer work should be done because there is something offered to eat [a referencing the lunchtime volunteering]." (Regional 1)

Because of this shift from the 1990s to the 2000s, ENGOs have struggled to gain a base in the public sector, but some ENGOs in this study recognize that, recently, the public trust has increased, though not to levels it may have been in the 1990s. Regional 3 confirms this by sharing that they perceive a slight improvement in the public's support of NGOs compared to the past:

> "These days, it seems like awareness is rising a bit. I'd say 50% are seen positively. In the past, I'd say about 70% were seen negatively… But now, I think it has changed a lot. Yes, our country's level until now, has gotten better." (Regional 3)

According to Regional 3's experience in the NGO sector, they now feel that the public is split halfway as to how positively or negatively they see NGOs. Regional 3 believes that the public's perception of NGOs was more negative in the "past," and that the Korean public now has a better view of ENGOs. Still, if such an improvement has merely resulted in the suggested 50:50 split there is certainly a lot of room for ENGOs to grow to be more accepted by the public.

A potential moment when the public's perception of ENGOs turned more positive was observed by Seoul 3 who saw public support of their organization increase after the Four Major Rivers Project's failures were revealed. Activist 2 from Seoul 3 believes fallout from this project fostered a turning point in Korean environmental and political and movements. Environmentally, the project resulted in large-scale environmental degradation which the public found troubling, and, after which, the public began to divide ideologically. Politically, President Park carried some of the blame that came from Lee's failures. This, combined with Park's own corruption scandals,

allowed the public's voice to grow even "louder" (Seoul 3, activist 2). President Moon has now been elected to office and public perception of ENGOs has remained "dynamic," though "unstable" (Seoul 3, activist 2). It is also characterized that the "political will [to drive change] is still lacking" and therefore ENGOs must remain as "watchdogs" to the government (Seoul 3, activist 2).

Lack of Public Support of Environmental Agendas

While activist 2 from Seoul 3 is remaining vigilant of the support for their original agendas rooted in democratization, their counterparts working on ocean issues still find difficulty in obtaining public support, "The Korean sea is wide and even though three sides are ocean, the interest in ocean is strangely lowering" (Seoul 3, activist 1). This lack of public interest in the ocean is worrisome to the activist from Seoul 3. The greater fear of ENGOs in this study, however, is that they are at a crossroads with the public's attention toward environmental issues. Environmental agendas that are new to Korea, such as ocean issues, may not bring ENGOs the same support that they are used to having from the public:

> "Say something about Korean ENGOs? Not just in Korea, this could be an issue world-wide, but people are focusing mostly on development. Changing this thinking will take quite a long time. Before that time, I worry…Well, people know the important things, but actually taking action is a challenge." (Seoul 3, activist 1)

The activist sees that the public, at least in Korea, is focused on development rather than on environmental issues. They might expect there to be, for example, a need to fill the gap between the public's knowing that an ocean environmental issue is important and the public's willingness to advocate for channeling that knowledge into action, but, instead, are finding there is no public knowledge to even begin obtaining support. This activist's perception of ocean activism in Korea is bleak, "There aren't many NGOs working on ocean issues" (Seoul 3, activist 1). Similarly,

activists from International 1, Regional 2, and Regional 4 all advocate for ocean issues and all find frustration in the lack public awareness of ocean issues. Together, these four ENGOs perceive ocean issues as having so little public traction they each feel they have been going it alone. This bring up the question, why are ocean issues, not perceived as important to the public?

> "The government may focus on actual regulations, policies, and health, but in order to increase the reception of policies to the people, there need to be a lot of civil society or local residents campaigns, exchanges, and policies, but I don't think there are many of these activities yet. So now the ocean side is very weak." (Regional 2)

When explaining this dearth in their own experience advocating for ocean issues, International 1 shares, "Actually [our agenda] is not local issue. We don't have public empathy or sympathy. No one actually cares" (International 1). The activist from International 1 explains that because they knew their agenda would not have public support, they had to begin their work with a top-down approach. They started by leveraging international pressure to influence the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries. This pressure was actually felt by the president of Korea at the time, Park Geun Hye, who then sent direct orders to the Ministry to work with International 1. As time went on, International 1's efforts lost the momentum of the international pressure within the Korean government and they had not campaigned with the public, so there was a vacuum of support. International 1's activists have attempted to lobby members of the National Assembly, but even at that level, where there are known supporters of other environmental agendas, they have not been able to gather support because National Assembly members would only listen if the public support for ocean issues were stronger. International 1 and Seoul 3 joined a coalition of NGOs that now works together to find out how to better advocate for ocean issues in Korea. This case displays the

importance of public support for environmental issues and what can happen to advocacy when an NGO fails to establish a grassroots level support.

Regional 2 is another ENGO that recognizes there is a lack of public interest in ocean agendas. They share ideas of how to mediate this weakness of ocean issues in the public:

> "[Ocean issues] needs to be equipped with hardware. For example, when there has to be discharge released, you ask, *What should we do?* And then you have to write to an international organization. We have a big ship, but it isn't ours, so we aren't using it. There is almost no ocean research that has crossed over into civil society…Yesterday, we surveyed about 1,000 people, and the number one problem they think we need to solve with water is dangerous substances, and the number two is environmental hormones and marine microplastics. It would be the first time microplastics would have been ranked. And [Regional 3] continues to promote and campaign." (Regional 2)

Here, this organization recognizes that while the public's support is weak on ocean issues, there are different ways to address this, such as public awareness campaigns and open dialogue. The "hardware" they speak of is an allusion to the perceived disconnect between the government and the urgency towards ocean-related policies. Having to rely on international-level decision making to then make decisions at the level of their ENGO, skipping any notion of national government completely, showcases this disconnect. Perhaps one way to address this disconnect is to leverage the public who are "voters," like Seoul 1 and Seoul 3 do when advocating for more historically public-supported agendas, but there is no leverage when the public is disinterested. In order to raise awareness in the public, Regional 2 works on the frontlines of ocean research, in the public sphere. One tactic they learned for appealing to the public which they may pursue is to combine

ocean issues with health and safety issues. This hunch is informed by results of their survey showing that the public's awareness of microplastics on human health has grown significantly. They also perceive that there is a growing public awareness on ocean issues locally, which they attribute to the impact the advocacy work done by Regional 3. Regional 2 is aware that ocean issues do not garner the same attention as agendas from the democratization era, like freshwater issues (rivers, streams, clean drinking water). If through the various advocacy methods they lay out, ocean issues do begin to grab the public's attention, then the future of ocean-focused ENGOs in Korea may be less lonesome and more productive in terms of impact on policies.

Changing Environmental Consciousness of the Public

Environmental NGOs with historically rooted anti-pollution and anti-development agendas that stem from the anti-authoritarian democratization movement perceive a new paradigm of environmentalism in Korea. The vice president for Seoul 2, for example, has noticed how their advocacy strategies are changing from fighting with the government over pollution and development issues to determining a structure to solve these issues without a political battle. They believe that Korean ENGOs will no longer have to fight mega development projects, but will, instead, need to continue to address the effects of those projects and future changes in society. The interviewee hopes these changes will be rational and not extreme like before. If this new social paradigm is pursued, political ideology will not matter, and governance will be more meaningful:

> "Like in the past, I don't think there will be another Four Major Rivers Project, or *sadaekang* (사대강). But the past's products that were made by our society's recognized paradigm will continue to exist…Whether it's the government or by our society, progressive or conservative, this thing called social progress has to be developed rationally. As depth and breadth expand, society becomes very

> rational… I think that there will be no extreme way like in the past. I also think that it can go an even better way. Therefore, I think there will be no retreat from the formation of meaningful parts of governance structure." (Seoul 2)

There has always been room for improvement on policies, but Korean society may have reached a new paradigm where mega projects such as Park Chung Hee's Four Major Rivers Project are never allowed to come to fruition again. Seoul 2's vice president remains hopeful that society's continuous evolution will bring about meaningful change for the environmental movement. If Seoul 2 and other ENGOs continue to share their research to inform society and the government, no matter who is in power, and as long as leaders are making rational decisions, there will be progress. However, social progression may not always be rational, and this provides for concern. In Korea's case, the agendas of development and conservation have historically been pitted against one another, but according to Seoul 2, this dichotomy is not rational. They note that internationally there exists no agreed upon indicator of sustainability that might trickle down to the local level in Korea. Because of this, local communities are left to express any development-related wishes to completely anti-development conservationists. While environmental activists may still strongly associate development in Korea in the time of Park Chung Hee's authoritarian regime with the suffering that laborers, students, scholars, and the middle class went through to achieve democratization, the Korean public may no longer care. Environmental NGOs, it appears, have a choice whether or not to perpetuate this dichotomy between development and conservation when setting their agendas.

Seoul 5's activist comments on their frustration with the propensity to focus on anti-development and the future of environmental agendas in Korea:

> "Civil society itself is the product of 1987. The way citizens generally refer to themselves as democratic forces tends to blur the evaluation as time goes by…Overall, the entire Korean society has a less reliable context for the so-called "86 generation" or the "democratic generation" …For those who have never experienced such things like democratization, we have to persuade them with only the activities we've done. In that regard, the environment is very political in some ways. When we talk about climate change, about energy, about waste, it depends on the political position." (Seoul 5)

According to Seoul 5, there is a generation gap in Korean environmentalism. Those from the democratization era hold onto the "development verses conservation" dichotomy and the younger generation, who did not experience democratization, cares about issues such as climate change. Environmental NGOs such as Seoul 5 are faced with the challenge of shifting their agendas to match the new generation's interests. Seoul 5 feels that there needs to be a new paradigm shift in the environmental movement in Korea, especially if society is at a point where it knows it needs to take action on newer and pressing issues like climate change, but cannot yet make this change due to pressures outside of their direct control:

> "When will we do the environmental movement of developed countries? I still don't think we could afford to go fight climate change because the development issues and the development agendas are still big issues. I think climate change will be a political issue in Korean society, like Europe and America…In the next general election, and the next presidential election, climate change will be big. I think it's going to change." (Seoul 5)

The Seoul 5 activist is concerned that the agendas of past environmentalism are too focused on anti-development and that the public does not provide enough support for ENGOs to expand their advocacy. Other ENGOs whose agendas date back to the democratization era remain active in policy making, but still only focus on the same issues from the past. However, this activist observes there is a new generational shift in environmentalism which may create a directional shift in the agendas of organizations with long, unchanging histories. Environmental NGOs who stem from the democratization era may be considering shifting their agendas away from development versus conservation to match the rising generation of environmentalism as it relates to the growing concerns of social justice and environmentalism. If these ENGOs do so, will the public support of these ENGOs increase? Perhaps put more simply, is Korean society as a whole ready for a new stage in its environmental movement?

IV. Conclusion

This is a preliminary, hypothesis-generating study on the organizational sustainability of ENGOs operating in Korea. Organizational sustainability was assessed through an examination of the seven indicators from the FHI 360 CSOSI. Though originally developed to assess the growth of NGO sectors in developing nations, these indicators were adapted in this study for use in a recently democratized and recently industrialized nation. Interview responses from 14 Korean nationals at 11 ENGOs operating in Korea were evaluated on three themes that emerged out of a historical review of the Korean environmental movement and emergence of Korean ENGOs. These themes are autonomy from the government, advocacy alignment with government agendas, and public perception. This study renders an image of the ENGO sector in Korea and allows research to better understand why the three themes emerged from the historical review.

The pursuit of autonomy by ENGOs in Korea is a complicated matter, especially when compared to other industrialized societies, primarily because the Korean government has had a heavy hand in shaping civil society. Registration of NGOs alone blurs the boundary as its successful completion depends on the government's approval. It has been shown that while member recruitment is a requirement of registration, intake of funding from membership may not be enough for activists to make a livable wage or for a given ENGO to sustain a prolonged agenda of its choice. Most ENGOs are thus driven to diversify their financial management structure. When ENGOs turn to business, they run the risk of becoming *de facto* marketers or a sales force for a business. When they turn to government funding, such reliance results in genuine worry about the independence of their advocacy as proposals must be prepared to be acceptable to the government. If money is granted, the ENGO must then strictly adhere to the proposal. Moreover, as the pool of government funding has been shown to have peaked, and is now decreasing, ENGOs are finding

the strictness in government selection is only increasing. This furthers the fear of diminished autonomy as ENGOs may feel forced to align their agendas to match the government.

Nonetheless, this study has also shown that when there is favorable public perception of an ENGO, they may be able to reduce or eliminate their reliance on government funding. Being large and favorably viewed, an ENGO can draw on membership. Being small and favorably viewed, an ENGO can draw upon foundations. In both cases, positive public perception can allow an ENGO to separate itself from government agendas and achieve autonomy. Where public perception is viewed as a stumbling block, it has been shown to be related to the recognition by ENGOs that they cannot remain attached to the pre-democratization agendas of anti-pollution and anti-development. They must pivot toward new and pressing issues, many of which will require international participation, such as climate change, micro dust, plastics and other ocean issues in an arena where there is general unfamiliarity among the Korean public with regards to these topics. It is worrying that this necessary switch in focus could likely be accompanied by a decrease in positive public perception one way or another. One solution may be that ENGOs emphasize their shift away from the anachronistic democratization agenda toward an agenda addressing issues requiring global cooperation, and ENGOs report that public awareness and acceptance of these new agendas is growing inside Korea. The ENGOs in this study whose advocacy closely aligns with the policy making process see bright futures for their organizations so long as the public interest in their agendas continues to rise. With a rise in public support, ENGOs may continue to gather membership fees, foundation grants, donations, and the numbers needed to display to policy makers that the public cares about environmental policy change. Korean ENGOs, at least those in this study who work on policy advocacy, are comfortable with the closeness to which they work with the government, so long as the public continues their grassroots support.

It appears that in Korea, where democratization and industrialization has only come about recently and social development was led by the state, a Western conceptualization (or the use of "East Asian" generalities) to explain the organizational sustainability of the NGO sector may be, to some degree, a misapplication. The autonomy granted NGOs in a Western setting is generally desired by, but not always possibly for, Korean ENGOs. Moreover, when desired, autonomy is not always readily achievable. Future studies on an NGO sector, environmental or not, in another nation, must pay closer attention to contextual nuances when applying Western concepts to non-Western cases of democratization, industrialization and social development. Future studies on the Korean ENGO sector are suggested to address the following hypotheses:

H1: *For registered ENGOs in Korea, public support, through membership fees, donations, or foundation grants is more beneficial to organizational sustainability than aligning one's agenda with the government as it leads to a lower risk of becoming dependent on government funding*.

ENGOs in this study that now rely on the government have shown signs they can no longer rely on membership fees alone to carry out their advocacy. As these organizations have come to rely more on government funding than their own members' fees, they fear co-optation by the government. The ENGOs in the study with the largest membership bases also show they are able to minimize or possibly eliminate government as a funding source.

H2: *Registration of ENGOs may increase if the emerging environmental agenda such as climate change, micro dust, plastics, and ocean issues are framed politically, as were the anti-pollution and anti-development agendas from the democratization era.*

Korean ENGOs filled in the spaces left by weak political parties after democratization, and the politicization of their agendas engendered public support needed for environmental policy change since democratization. This pattern seems to repeat itself in any situation in which those

who favor development of an economy chose to ignore environmental costs. With a slate of new issues facing them, some can certainly be tackled by ENGOs in a way that would bring about a political fight. Environmental NGOs examined in this study also have proven themselves to be very effective working closely with government. They appreciate a political approach and have demonstrated efficiency in achieving environmental solutions. Engaging the public by addressing issues as political seems a natural extension of talents ENGOs already possess, and as a public maddens to a cause, those wishing to be effective might be expected to form up.

H3: *As environmental agendas shift toward those of a more global nature, Korean ENGOs can expect to have to form coalitions with well-funded international ENGOs or be forced to compete with them for public support.*

International environmental issues have discovered Korea. International ENGOs have discovered Korea, too, and they tend to come financially prepared. They arrive with reputations which can be put to use immediately in a new setting, and if it is required, they can be expected to fund a public relations budget. With only so many domestic resources to go around, well-funded International ENGOs may compete for public attention with domestic ENGOs. For an ENGO whose sustainability is determined by their membership fees and donations, survival may require co-optation by a competitor, not a government. It has also been demonstrated that the large size of the largest domestic ENGOs has been achieved through consolidation. To the stand-alone ENGOs of Korea, the act of consolidation is not novel, and if organizational sustainability is the reward, the act of consolidation may be viable. Conversely, International ENGOs may partner with domestic ENGOs to build a support base in the public on new agendas, helping domestic ENGOs gain the public support needed to sustain their operation and advocacy.

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Appendix I

Interview Guide

Interviewee: NGO

Intro Questions:

1. Hello, thank you for taking the time today from your busy schedule to meet with us. Before we begin, I would like to ask if you consent to being recorded. Your responses will be representative of your NGO, but your individual identity, title, and position will remain anonymous. The recordings of this interview will be destroyed once they are transcribed.
   (안녕하세요. 바쁜데 오늘 저희를 만나 주셔서 감사합니다. 인터뷰를 시작하기 전에 녹음을 해도 좋을지 여쭙고 싶습니다. 녹음은 논문용으로 쓰이기 때문에 인터뷰 내용을 정리하기 위한 용도로만 쓰이고요, 내용은 익명으로 처리되며 다른 용도로는 쓰이지 않습니다. 녹음을 받아쓴 이후에는 파기하겠습니다.)
1. What is the title of your current position here?
   (여기서 선생님의 직책은 무엇인가요?)
2. How many years have you been at this NGO? Have you worked at another NGO before? If so, which one? How many years in total have you worked with NGOs?
   (얼마나 여기 민간단체에 계셨나요? 여기 전에도 다른 민간단체에서 활동하셨나요? 어떤 곳인지 말씀해주셔도 될까요? 민간단체에서 총 얼마나 오래 활동하셨나요?)
3. When was this NGO founded?
   (지금 여기 민간단체는 언제 창립되었나요?)
4. What is the mission of your NGO?
   (여기 민간단체의 설립 목적은 무엇인가요?)

Main Questions:

1. How does your organization decide which environmental issues you will work on?
   (지금 계시는 단체에서는 지금 관심을 갖고 활동 중이신 환경이슈를 어떻게 결정하나요?)
2. In what ways can your organization influence these environmental issues?
   (단체에서는 어떤 방법으로 환경이슈에 영향을 주시나요?)
    a. How has this ability changed over time? Such as with changing presidencies or changed or new policies?
       (단체의 영향력이 정권이 바뀌거나 새로운 정책이 들어서면서 변화가 있었나요? 예를 들어 대통령이 바뀌었다거나 새로운 정책이 들어섰다거나?)
3. Can you describe who your supporters are and how you engage (with) them?

(단체를 지지하는 분들은 어떤 분들인지? 그리고 그들의 지지를 어떻게 확보하셨나요?

4. In what ways do you assist your supporters? For example, do you provide education materials, data collection, litigation, monitoring, pollution reporting?
(어떤 방식으로 단체나 선생님께서는 지지하들을 도우시나요? 예를 들어 교육자료나 자료집을 제공하거나, 법률소송을 대신하거나, 모니터링 또는 오염 단속결과 등을 제공한다거나 하는 방식을 생각할 수 있을 것 같은데요.)
    a. In what ways do you assist the government or private sector?
    (혹시 후원자가 아니라 정부나 기업 등을 돕는 방식이 있나요? 있다면 어떤 방식인가요?)
5. I would like to understand more about how NGOs can impact policy decisions about environmental issues. Where in the policy decision process do you think NGOs such as your own can get involved?
(민간단체가 환경문제에 관한 정책결정에 어떻게 영향을 주나요? 특히 정책결정 과정에서 어느 시점이나 단계에서 영향을 미치는지요?
    a. What about your relationship with the [ministry or office] – do they communicate with you? Can they use your input?
    (정부와의 관계는 어떤가요? 그들과 소통이 잘 이루어지나요? 혹은 정부에서 단체의 요구나 주장을 잘 활용하나요?)
6. Does it help your organization to be registered to [insert Ministry name]? If yes, how?
(민간단체 등록제가 있던데 정부에 등록을 하면 어떤 도움을 받을 수 있나요? 등록이 되었다면 어떤 부처에 하셨는지, 그리고 도움이 된다면 어떤 도움이 있을까요?)
    a. If no, why did you register if you do not benefit from registration?
    (등록이 되어도 정부로 혜택이 없다면 등록을 해야 하는 다른 이유가 있나요?)
7. When your NGOs was registered, where there any barriers to registration? If so, what barriers were there?
(혹시 등록을 하셨다면 특별한 자격요건이 있나요? 있다면 어떤건가요?)
    a. Have these barriers changed over time since your NGO registered? If so, in what ways? (이런 자격요건은 등록하신 이후에 혹시 변화가 있었나요? 있다면 어떤 변화인지요.)
8. Have there been changes in how your organization has worked with the government/ministry over time? Such as with changes to the political regime or introduction of new laws?
(정부와 일하는 방식에서 그동안 어떤 변화가 있었는지 궁금합니다. 예를 들어 정권이 바뀐다든지 새로운 법이 제정되었다거나에 따라 달라질 것 같은데요.)

a. Do you worry about future changes in political regimes or policies affecting how your organization works with the government?
(혹시 앞으로 정권의 교체나 정책의 변화가 지금 계신 민간단체가 정부와 일하는 방식에 변화를 줄 수 있다는 우려하시나요?)

9. What resources do you currently have at your NGO aside from funding (such as technology or expertise/specially skilled workers/networks)?
(단체에서는 활동하시는 데 재원 이외에 어떤 방법이나 수단을 활용하시나요? 예를 들어 특정분야의 기술이나 전문성, 특화된 활동가, 전문가 네트워크처럼 환경문제를 해결하려고 활동하실 때 활용하는 방법에 대해 알고 싶습니다)
    a. If not, what other resources would you need?
    (그렇지 않다면 어떤 수단들이 더 필요하다고 생각하시나요?)
10. May I ask about the funding available to your NGO? What funding sources are available to your organization?
(혹시 제가 계시는 단체에서 쓰시는 재원에 대해 여쭤봐도 될까요? 활동에 필요한 재원은 어떻게 마련하시나요?)
    a. Using a percentage, what would you say is currently the share each source contributes to your funding?
    (재원의 소스를 나누어 보면 각각 몇 퍼센트나 될까요?)
        i. Do you publish your financial resources? Such as an online report?
        (혹시 재정규모나 쓰임새를 온라인 등에서 볼 수 있게 보고서로 발간하시나요?)
    b. Do you feel that your organization has sufficient funding to accomplish its mission? (단체가 활동하시는데 필요한 충분한 재원을 확보하고 있다고 느끼시나요?)
11. Could you share the ways in which NGOs can draw on support from the government beyond financial support? Has your NGO received any assistance such as training, information, technology? If so, from whom?
(혹시 민간단체들은 정부한테서 재정보조 말고 다른 방식의 지원을 받고 있다고 생각하세요? 혹시 있다면 알려주실 수 있나요? 예를 들어 교육 훈련이나 정보, 기술 같은 분야에서 지원을 받을 수 있을 것 같은데, 혹시 어떤 부처에서 이런 지원이 가능한가요?)
12. Does your NGO ever partner with other NGOs? If so, with whom?
(지금 계시는 단체는 다른 단체와 파트너십을 갖고 계신가요? 그렇다면 어떤 단체인가요?)
    a. Have you ever considered partnering with the government?
    (정부와의 파트너십은 생각해보신 적은 없나요?)
    b. What about the private sector?
    (기업과 같은 민간과의 협력은 어떤가요?)

13. Does your NGO appear on any media sources? If yes, to what extent is the media coverage of your organization positive?
    (지금 계시는 단체는 주로 어떤 종류의 대중매체에 등장하나요? 그리고 이런 등장이 단체의 활동에 긍정적인가요?)
    a. Have you seen (or do you know of) any changes in public perception of your NGO over time?
       (현재 계시는 민간단체에 대한 대중의 관점이나 시각이 시간에 따라 변화했나요?)
14. On average, how do you think the private sector views NGOs?
    (선생님이 보시기에 평균적으로 기업 등 민간에서는 민간단체를 어떻게 본다고 생각하시나요?)
15. On average, how do you think the government views NGOs?
    (선생님이 보시기에 평균적으로 정부부처에서는 민간단체를 어떻게 본다고 생각하시나요?)

Closing Questions:

1. Thank you, again, for sharing your time with me today. Is there anything about the role of environmental NGOs that you believe is important, but I did not ask about?
   (오늘 시간 내주셔서 정말 감사합니다. 혹시 민간환경단체의 역할 중 선생님이 중요하다고 생각하시는 다른 것들이 있으면 들려주세요.)
2. Do you have any questions for me?
   (저에게 혹시 물으실 것이 있으면 말씀해주세요)
3. Finally, would you mind if I were to contact you in the future to share the recording, clarify statements, and share the findings of the study?
   (혹시 제가 오늘 인터뷰한 내용에 대해서 나중에 확인차 여쭈어 봐도 될까요?)

Appendix II

Code Book

Code Groups	Code
Advocacy	Activities
Advocacy	Advocacy for NGO Law Reform
Advocacy	Agenda
Advocacy	Agenda Business
Advocacy	Agenda Changes
Advocacy	Agenda Conflict
Advocacy	Agenda Future
Advocacy	Agenda Government
Advocacy	Agenda Media
Advocacy	Agenda Public
Advocacy	Agenda Selection
Advocacy	Collaboration with Government
Advocacy	Collaboration with other NGOs
Advocacy	Lobbying Efforts
Advocacy	Policy-Making Process
Financial Viability	Earned Income
Financial Viability	Financial Management Systems
Financial Viability	Financial Resources Impact on Activities
Financial Viability	Financial Resources Impact on Agenda
Financial Viability	Foreign Financial Support
Financial Viability	Fundraising
Financial Viability	Government Funding of Projects (Not Direct to NGO)
Financial Viability	Government Grants (Application)
Financial Viability	Government Grants (Benefits)
Financial Viability	Government Grants (Difficulty)
Financial Viability	Government Grants (Misuse)
Financial Viability	Government Grants (Reliance)
Financial Viability	Impact of Activities on Funding
Financial Viability	Impact of Agenda on Funding
Financial Viability	Membership Fees
Financial Viability	Percentage of Funding by Source
Financial Viability	Private Sector Funding
Legal Environment	Laws on Operation
Legal Environment	Ministries
Legal Environment	Ministry of Environment

Legal Environment	Ministry of Food and Agriculture
Legal Environment	Ministry of Interior and Safety
Legal Environment	Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries
Legal Environment	NGO Support Law
Legal Environment	Registration
Legal Environment	Registration Barrier
Legal Environment	Registration Benefit
Legal Environment	Registration Requirement
Legal Environment	Suppression
Legal Environment	Taxation
Legal Environment	Volunteerism Law
Organizational Capacity	Internal Management Structure
Organizational Capacity	Local Scope
Organizational Capacity	Location of HQ
Organizational Capacity	Membership
Organizational Capacity	Membership recruitment
Organizational Capacity	Missing Resources
Organizational Capacity	National Scope
Organizational Capacity	NGO Partners Recruitment
Organizational Capacity	NGO President's Experience
Organizational Capacity	NGO Workforce Capacity
Organizational Capacity	NGO Workforce's Experience
Organizational Capacity	Resources (Not Financial)
Organizational Capacity	Strategic Planning
Organizational Capacity	Volunteer Recruitment
Organizational Capacity	Volunteers
Public Image	Business Perception
Public Image	Government Perception
Public Image	International Perception
Public Image	Media
Public Image	Media Coverage
Public Image	Media Perception

Public Image	Perception of Regimes
Public Image	Public Perception
Public Image	Public Relations
Public Image	Regime Change
Public Image	Regime Preference
Public Image	Self-Regulation
Sectoral Infrastructure	Foundations
Sectoral Infrastructure	NGO Coalition
Sectoral Infrastructure	NGO Resource Centers
Sectoral Infrastructure	NGO Support Organizations
Sectoral Infrastructure	NGO Training Programs
Sectoral Infrastructure	Partnership with Business
Sectoral Infrastructure	Partnership with Government
Sectoral Infrastructure	Partnership with IOs
Sectoral Infrastructure	Partnership with Media
Sectoral Infrastructure	Partnership with other NGOs
Sectoral Infrastructure	Perception of Partnerships
Service Provision	Government Recognition
Service Provision	NGO Enterprises
Service Provision	NGO Provided Services
Service Provision	Services for Business
Service Provision	Services for Government
Service Provision	Services for NGOs
Service Provision	Services for the Public